

OPEN ACCESS



International Journal of
Peace and Development Studies

January-June 2021
ISSN: 2141-6621
DOI: 10.5897/IJPD
www.academicjournals.org

 **ACADEMIC
JOURNALS**
expand your knowledge

About IJPDS

The International Journal of Peace and Development Studies (IJPDS) is a peer reviewed open access journal. The journal commenced publication in October 2010. IJPDS welcomes articles that examines the topics relating to peace and conflict management such as the origins and nature of conflicts, conflict resolution processes, contemporary cases and responses to armed conflicts, peace building and development, political development and conflict management, peace and nonviolent resistance, education and sustainable development, corruption and governance institutions, security and development strategies, defence and security of African countries and peace, regional integration and development.

Indexing

[CNKI Scholar](#), [Dimensions Database](#), [Genamics JournalSeek](#), [JournalTOCs](#), [Society of African Journal Editors – SAJE Library](#), [WorldCat](#)

Open Access Policy

Open Access is a publication model that enables the dissemination of research articles to the global community without any form of restriction. All articles published under open access can be accessed by anyone with internet connection.

The International Journal of Peace and Development Studies is an Open Access journal. Abstracts and full texts of all articles published in this journal are freely accessible to everyone immediately after publication without any form of restriction.

Article License

All articles published by International Journal of Peace and Development Studies are licensed under the [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](#). This permits anyone to copy, redistribute, remix, transmit and adapt the work provided the original work and source is appropriately cited. Citation should include the article DOI. The article license is displayed on the abstract page the following statement:

This article is published under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0](#)

Please refer to <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode> for details about [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0](#)

Article Copyright

When an article is published in the journal, the author(s) of the article retain the copyright. Author(s) may republish the article as part of a book or other materials.

A copyright statement is displayed both on the abstract page and the full-text PDF of each article.

Example: Copyright ©2016 Author(s) retains the copyright of this article.

Self-Archiving Policy

IJPDS permits and encourage authors to archive any version of their article they find most suitable, including the published version on their institutional repository and any other suitable website.

Digital Archiving Policy

The International Journal of Peace and Development Studies is committed to the long-term preservation of its content. All articles published by the journal are preserved by Portico. In addition, the journal encourages authors to archive the published version of their articles on their institutional repositories and as well as other appropriate websites.

<https://www.portico.org/publishers/ajournals/>

Metadata Harvesting

The International Journal of Peace and Development Studies encourages metadata harvesting of all its content. The journal fully supports the Open Archives Initiative.

Memberships and Standards



Academic Journals strongly supports the Open Access initiative. Abstracts and full texts of all articles published by Academic Journals are freely accessible to everyone immediately after publication.



All articles published by Academic Journals are licensed under the [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License \(CC BY 4.0\)](#). This permits anyone to copy, redistribute, remix, transmit and adapt the work provided the original work and source is appropriately cited.



[Crossref](#) is an association of scholarly publishers that developed Digital Object Identification (DOI) system for the unique identification published materials. Academic Journals is a member of Crossref and uses the DOI system. All articles published by Academic Journals are issued DOI.

[Similarity Check](#) powered by iThenticate is an initiative started by CrossRef to help its members actively engage in efforts to prevent scholarly and professional plagiarism. Academic Journals is a member of Similarity Check.

[CrossRef Cited-by](#) Linking (formerly Forward Linking) is a service that allows you to discover how your publications are being cited and to incorporate that information into your online publication platform. Academic Journals is a member of [CrossRef Cited-by](#).



Academic Journals is a member of the [International Digital Publishing Forum \(IDPF\)](#). The IDPF is the global trade and standards organization dedicated to the development and promotion of electronic publishing and content consumption.

Contact

Editorial Office: ijpds@academicjournals.org

Help Desk: helpdesk@academicjournals.org

Website: <https://academicjournals.org/journal/IJPDS>

Submit manuscript online <http://ms.academicjournals.org>

Academic Journals
73023 Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria
ICEA Building, 17th Floor,
Kenyatta Avenue, Nairobi, Kenya.

Editors

Prof. Yusef Waghid

*Stellenbosch University,
South Africa.*

Dr. Louise Brådvik

*Department of Psychiatry
Lund University,
Sweden.*

Dr. Oseni Taiwo Afisi

*Lagos State University,
Nigeria.*

Dr. Liang-Yu Deng

*Chung-Yuan Christian University
Taiwan, (ROC).*

Prof. Jephias Mapuva

*Department of Geography and Development
Studies
Bindura University of Science Education
Bindura,
Zimbabwe.*

Dr. George Shambaugh

*Georgetown University
USA.*

Prof. Richard J. Estes

*University of Pennsylvania
USA.*

Prof. Etienne Piguet

*University of Neuchatel
Switzerland.*

Dr. Jacqueline Akhurst

*York St John University
UK.*

Dr. Pahimi Patrice

*History Department,
University of Maroua,
Cameroon.*

Dr. Alexander Makulilo

*Department of Political Science and Public
Administration,
University of Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania.*

Dr. Ngambouk Vitalis Pemunta

*Department of Cultural Studies
Linnaeus University
Växjö,
Sweden.*

Dr. Alireza Salehi Nejad

*Department of British Studies
University of Tehran
Iran.*

Dr. Jeffrey Kurebwa

*Peace and governance,
Bindura university of science education,
Zimbabwe.*

Prof. Kathleen Malley-Morrison

*Boston University
USA.*

Table of Content

Human security and threats associated with the impacts of 2019 Hong Kong social unrest	1
Bryan Tzu Wei LUK	
Police officers' perceptions about corruption in Zimbabwe: A case of police officers at a University	11
Tapfuiwa James Katsinde	
The post genocide reconciliation in Rwanda: Erasing ethnicity and building citizenship	23
Ouafaa RAFI	
Indigenous knowledge of conflict resolution for transformative peace building: Amare of Jama Woreda, Amhara - Ethiopia	30
Kefelegn Tesfaye	
Remembering summerdale: A scandal that reformed policing	38
Greg Hoffman and Anne D. Kroemer	

Full Length Research Paper

Human security and threats associated with the impacts of 2019 Hong Kong social unrest

Bryan Tzu Wei LUK

Program of Peace and Conflict Studies of Basic Law Foundation, Hong Kong, China.

Received 15 December, 2020; Accepted 24 March, 2021

Hong Kong has just experienced unprecedented social unrest that started in 2019. The unrest dragged the city into a chaotic situation that had not been seen in the last 50 years. Violence and crimes occurred across every corner of the territory, affecting every citizen's livelihood. Several studies have been carried out, analyzing its social, economic, and political causes. However, most of them are limited to the political scope, and there is no profound work comprehensively reviewing and organizing the security impacts against citizens in Hong Kong. In that case, this article aims to fill up this missing gap by exploring its impacts on personal and community security that are adhered to the human security concept and framework. The article lists several critical personal and community insecurities and threats, which were respectively (1) group conflicts and increasing crime rate, (2) the legitimacy issue caused by the distrust among citizens and authorities, (3) psychological stresses that endanger public mental health and (4) violent political radicalization that could potentially trigger future hate crime and violent extremism. Thus it argued that the community stakeholders and government shall first mobilize their resources on handling these issues and shall introduce multipronged, peace-oriented and sustainable policies to handle them in a cost-effective and timely manner.

Key words: Human security, anti-bill social unrest, conflict and peace studies, Hong Kong.

INTRODUCTION

Hong Kong has enjoyed a decade of rapid economic development due to the positive reputation of its high degree of economic and social freedom, mature rule of law and justice system, effective criminal law enforcement, and socio-political stability and prosperity. However, the outbreak of 2019 Hong Kong social unrest might pin down a changing point of Hong Kong's future.

It has experienced a series of destructive social unrest and disorders that was directly triggered by the introduction of the Fugitive Offenders Amendment Bill by

the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). It started as a small-scale anti-bill protest in March 2019 with around 5,200 people and then turned into en masse demonstrations with 280,000 people (Statistic of Hong Kong Police Force) or 1.03 million people (claimed by the organizers) on 9th June 2019. Due to the government's failures of properly and effectively responding and addressing public outcry and concerns, it subsequently evolved from an orderly demonstration into catastrophic leaderless violent-

E-mail bryanluktw@gmail.com or info@basiclawfoundation.org.

Author(s) agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

oriented unrest challenging against the legitimacy and authority of local and the Chinese central government (Purbrick, 2019). It had deeply affected society's stability and prosperity, as it was marked by a cycle of extreme widespread of serious crimes and damages (such as violent assaults, riots, vandalism, arsons, etc.) across every corner of the territory. As mentioned by the Honorable Mr. Justice Jeremy Poon Shiu-chor, an experienced criminal justice gatekeeper who was serving as the Chief Judge of the High Court and the President of Court of Appeal of HKSAR, he described such social unrest as "*a dire situation that has not been seen in the last 50 years*" while he was sitting in a case of judiciary review relating to the legality of Emergency Regulation Ordinance invoked by the HKSAR Government during the social unrest.

In late-January 2020, the outbreak of COVID-19 had indirectly paused the unstoppable unrest, although there were some related small-scale public disorders afterward. The massive social and political unrest brought a tremendous impact that included socio-economic and political aspects from microscopic to macroscopic level. Scholars, public policy researchers and government officials from both domestic and national sectors are currently studying its antecedents and consequences.

Currently, some notable works had recorded and analyzed the unrest from a legal and political perspective. For example, Lam (2020) had restructured its entire timeline and process; Greenwood-Reeves (2020) evaluated the case in a legal theory approach, studying how the poor constitutional morality damaged the legitimacy of the HKSAR Government and how it triggered corresponding protest action against the government; DeLisle (2019) reviewed how the social unrest was linked to the political paradox among autonomy, democracy and the rule of law under the Chinese sovereignty; Hui (2020) analyzed the political strategies adopted by the Chinese central government and HKSAR government to coercively counter the unrest. These studies had made a comprehensive review relating to the Hong Kong situation, yet they were limited to the scope of politics. Moreover, there is no profound work to comprehensively review and to organize the security impacts on citizens in Hong Kong. This missing puzzle becomes an obstacle for parties to prioritize and formulate effective peacebuilding and conflict resolution policies addressing the socio-political chaos.

In order to examine the impacts of 2019 social unrest thoroughly, it requires a careful examination of its *de facto* impacts on people, so that community stakeholders and government would be able to formulate plans and to introduce effective policies for the purpose of minimizing negative impacts adhered to the unrest and conflict resolutions. Therefore, this article aims to be a pioneer study to provide an organized analysis that could fill up a critical missing gap of the full picture by researching and analyzing its socio-political impacts and consequences

with the human security concepts and framework.

HUMAN SECURITY: CONCEPTS AND IMPLICATION

Human security is a new-concept officially introduced and advocated by the United Nation in 1994 with the report named *Human Development Report 1994* (United Nation Development Program, 1994). It was marked with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, which was a milestone symbolizing the end of the Cold War era between two super U.S-led western entente and USSR-led eastern bloc and the beginning of a contemporary world's peaceful period. During that period, observers started recognizing the neglect of the quality of life and non-military insecurities and threats (like degradation of the living environment, poor governance, and ineffective political system) could erode the foundation of state's and society's security, stability and prosperity (Alkire, 2003; King and Murray, 2002). It thus triggered scholars' attention to expanding the concept of 'security' beyond a traditional security concept that purely emphasized the national military level and realist-oriented approach to a non-traditional security mindset that embraced societal and human-centric level and developmental approach.

In other words, unlike the traditional realist concept of security, human security is not a state-centric nor national security-oriented; also, unlike the liberalism that only emphasizes the system and role of institutions; it is a people-centric concept that pays attention to the non-traditional threats cum people's insecurities, needs, feelings and perspectives (Alkire, 2003; Gomez and Gasper, 2013; King and Murray, 2002; Newman, 2001; Tadjbakhsh, 2005). Despite it had suffered criticisms in its early stage of development because of its underdeveloped theoretical framework and more importantly the international politics (Breslin and Christou, 2015), recent studies argued that it could be a useful practical approach to both analytical and planning works (Human Security Unit, 2016; Muguruza, 2007; Tadjbakhsh, 2015, 2005). In fact, countries like Japan, Canada, and the People's Republic of China had adopted the elements of the human security concept with their definitions, interpretations, and political agendas (Breslin and Christou, 2015; Guan and Guo, 2008). The reason why it is slowly being embraced by nation-states and international communities is that it provides a comprehensive multi-sectoral understanding of insecurities and threats with a framework of 7 aspects that could help researchers to study the case more organically. These aspects are respectively economic (freedom from poverty), food (access to clean food and water), health (access to proper and affordable health care and protection from diseases), environmental (protection from pollution), personal (for instances: physical safety from crime, violence, terrorism and conflicts), community (physical security of the groups),

and political (enjoyment of civil and political rights, freedom from political oppression) (Paris, 2001; United Nation Development Program, 1994).

Its frameworks and concepts do not only cover the narrow spectrum of threat or outbreak of violence, but additionally particularly useful to be a 'cutting edge policy tool' to study conflict studies by providing the means (1) to comprehensively assess the root causes, (2) to study consequences of conflicts in both intra-state or inter-state sectors, and (3) to assist policymaking and evaluation that based on human-centric perspective (Tadjabakhsh, 2015, 2005). In the present case, as studying the consequences of massive socio-political unrest and conflicts involves a tangible of questions and aspect, thus it is a suitable and effective theoretical framework to help the researcher to stay in scope and to develop an analysis for the case study.

This article focuses on personal and community security. Personal security extended across the security to other non-military threats such as crime against life and property, abuse (including self-abuse) and neglect. It refers to the personal protection from physical and psychological violence of the people, the state and other relevant entities. From a daily life perspective, the critical fear is the victimization of crime and violence (Gasper and Gomez, 2015; Gierszewski, 2017). Community security is defined as protection against the breakdown of communities and social groups (United Nation Development Program, 1994, 2009). It could include discrimination, exclusion, and violence from other groups and threats from the state. During the early stage of concept development, threats to community security mostly refer to inter-ethnic minorities and indigenous group tension (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009). Subsequently, a document published by UN Development Program's *Community security and social cohesion: Towards a UNDP approach* expanded it to a broader sense, combining the elements of both community and personal security and largely focusing on elements of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from wants' caused by the state and social issues.

Violent group conflicts and crime rate

Hong Kong was being known as top-six safest cities in the world by Gallup's *2018 Global Law and Order report* and ranked ninth according to the *Safe Cities Index 2017: Security in a rapidly urbanizing world* by the Intelligence Unit of the Economist due to its very low crime rate and high-level personal safety (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). However, after the outbreak of unrest in June 2019, it had brought profound impacts against personal and community security and safety.

According to the annual report on Hong Kong's law and order situation prepared by Police Force, the overall crime rate had continued to drop since 2010, from 75,965

cases to 54,225 cases in 2018 (Hong Kong Police Force, 2020b). In fact, in the first half of 2019, before the vital month of June 2019 that marked the beginning of social unrest, the crime rate recorded a 4.7% drop when compared with that of 2018 (Legislative Council of HKSAR, 2019). However, the rapid increase cases of violent crimes and public disorder offenses stemmed from the anti-bill social unrest had offset the decreased record of the first half year; hence, the yearly number of 2019 recorded a sharp rise for the first time since 2007. According to the official statistics of arrestees in public events, as of 30th June 2020, 9,216 persons were arrested directly connecting to anti-bill incidents, with 1,972 persons were under legal prosecution and 653 of them was charged with riot-related serious criminal offenses (Hong Kong Police Force, 2020a).

After the unrest outbreak occurred for a month, the social order and rule of law had fallen into malfunctioning status. The criminal justice system and social constrain system were both ineffective and dysfunctional, hence personal security was no longer well protected and guaranteed. The level of violent conflict extended from '*police to protesters*' then to '*citizens to citizens*' and the violent activities cum hate crimes spread to every corner in the city. The conflicts between Blue and Yellow ribbons played one of the key parts in eroding the foundation of the city's security.

The Blue represents their wish of "law and order" to the city and their supports to the government and law enforcement agencies; Yellow, in contrast, represents their dream for "democracy" and "freedom" through a series of massive civic disobediences and protests (their historical background will be explained in a later section). "One man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist", the Blue saw themselves as the real '*Rule of law protector*', and stigmatized the Yellow as '*terrorists*' or '*violent extremists*' as they felt their freedom of expression was being physically terrorized and violently suppressed by the Yellow; the Yellow, in opposite, saw themselves as '*freedom fighters*' and treated the Blue as '*Chinese communist lovers*' and the enemy of democracy and liberty. Such '*good-or-evil*' dualism resulted in a series of non-violent and violent confrontations in both the physical and digital fields between these two ideological-driven ribbons.

Statistically speaking, the main category of cases that recorded a significant rise was violent crime (defined as victim harmed by or threatened with violence), a rise of 9.1% compared to the statistic of 2018. Criminal damage increased 2629 cases, arson increased 637 cases, theft from vehicle increased 437 cases and serious assault increased 339 cases. Plus, offenses against public order had recorded 966 cases in 2019, 36 times higher while compared with only 26 cases in 2018. Furthermore, Police Force admitted that they had withdrawn stationed police services in specific public service facilities (the typical one was hospitals) and canceled regular high-

profile anti-crime foot patrol because of manpower deployment on counter-riot units, high risk of potential counter-police hate-crime attacks that were directly associated with the unrest and serious social discontent between the law enforcers and pro-protest citizens (Lo, 2019a). It resulted in a situation where no police patrolling on street for nearly half of the year, hence led to remarkable rise in serious burglary cases (Lo, 2019b). This observation was supported by the Hong Kong's law and order situation report, in which it showed a total of 819 cases increased.

Psychological damages

Apart from physical damages, studies suggested that there is a positive link between exposure to political violence and mental health issues during massive social unrest (Ni et al., 2020; Çelebi et al., 2020). It became an underlying issue relating to human psychological health and its influence on how citizens saw and interpreted their own social networks, authorities as well as the general living environment. Social Enterprise Summit's HKwecare conducted by Lam et al. (2019) had released a research report of happiness index 2019 (a total of 1,077 responses collected from 9th September 2019 to 23rd September 2019). It found out that the general happiness index hit to the 10-year lower, from 6.93 in 2017 to 6.15 in 2019, and the scoring category of (1) social and political environment, (2) government governance, and (3) law and order all suffered a serious drop, being ranked as top 3 lowest. The research team pointed out that these drops were the direct result of violent social unrest and the rapidly deteriorated relations among the public and authorities.

Moreover, Hong Kong Mental Health Index 2020, an annual survey organized by Joyful (Mental Health) Foundation (2019) showed a warning result. The average mental health index of Hong Kong citizens hit to new low, dropped from 46.41 in 2019 to 45.12 in 2020. An *ad hoc* survey that was conducted during the social unrest in January 2020, aiming to understand how the socio-political turmoil affected public mental health, generated an even lower score with only 44.48. Furthermore, the unrest's impact was stronger than the COVID-19 pandemic, where 54.4% of interviewees marked social controversies had a 'very large' or 'relatively large' negative effect on their mental health; only nearly 40% marked their emotions were negatively impacted by COVID-19. More specifically, in public health perspective, Ni et al. (2020) published a research study named "Depression and post-traumatic stress during major social unrest in Hong Kong: a 10-year prospective cohort study" on *The Lancet*, and the result pointed out that 22% adult respondents were suffering from probable depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Probable depression increased more than 5 times higher

than before and twice higher since the Occupy Central Movement occurred in 2014; the prevalence of PTSD symptoms rose 6 times higher during the social unrest while compared with data collected since the post-occupy central movement. The result was comparable to those areas and regions experiencing terrorist attacks, serious armed conflicts, and large scale human and natural disasters (Ni et al., 2020).

Legitimacy and public trust issues

Legitimacy is the right and acceptance of authority of the established governing system of rule of law and a regime. The HKSAR Government's agenda of "*stop the violence, curb the chaos*" had put itself onto opposition against Yellow ribbons. It caused the Yellow to see the government as '*enemy of the freedom fighter*', an authoritative, suppressive and illegitimate executive body. They rejected the supremacy of the Hong Kong Basic Law (the legal constitution of HKSAR) and challenged the authority of the Chinese central government. On the other hand, the HKSAR Government was not able to gain trust, confidence, and support from pro-government Blue ribbons as well. As the large scale of disorders, street violence and hate-crimes specifically targeting against Blue created a high magnitude of strains against them. The absence of police patrol and protection and malfunctioned and ineffective government administration, the Blue ribbons felt that Hong Kong, at that moment, was gradually falling into a terrorized and anarchic state, hence raised questions regarding the HKSAR Government's ability to safeguard public security and their right to freedom from fear. Both sides behold the local government had poorly handled the critical social controversy and questioned its legitimacy (Lo, 2020; Marques, 2020).

In fact, the result of public polling named *the popularity of government key officials of the HKSAR Government* and the Popularity of Chief Executive conducted by Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (2020) showed that all top-ranked official members of the government had suffered a huge drop since the beginning of social unrest. The Chief Executive (the head of the executive branch) enjoyed a relatively high supporting rate at 52.6 scores before the introduction of Amendment Bill in March 2019, but continually dropped to 20.8 in January 2020. Another top 3 political figures in the HKSAR Government all experienced a similar trend of losing popularity in the same period, where Chief Secretary of Hong Kong dropped from 47.65 to 25.95; Financial Secretary from 40.52 to 27.64; and Secretary for Justice from 34.38 to 14.54.

Apart from that, citizen's confidence and trust in the rule of law system suffered a huge drop. Bauhinia Foundation Research Centre, a local independent policy think tank, published a survey named *Public Perception*

toward the Rule of Law in Hong Kong in December 2019, it showed that citizens' general satisfaction and rating on rule of law system had an abrupt change, turned from positive to negative feedback in 2019 which was a remarkable distinctive different from those in the first two rounds conducted in 2017 and 2018. The findings of 2019 showed that only 11.7% of respondents satisfied with the rule of law, but with 52.2% were dissatisfied; hence 46.7% of respondents thought that the public awareness of the rule of law was 'inadequate', a 10.6% increase compared to 2018. Hence notably, the satisfaction rating of "maintaining law and order and personal safety protection" suffered the most drop and had only received a 4.05 score in 2019, while comparing to 6.83 scores in 2018. The general drop was believed to be the direct result of destructive unrest and the government's failures and policy omissions.

Political violent radicalization

Prior to the 2019 social unrest, Hong Kong had already experienced a rising issue of two-side political confrontation between the pro-establishment and pan-democratic camp, and experienced significant growth of radical right social movement and radical political-oriented groups with anti-mainland ideology adhered to the political manifesto of localism, self-determination and Hong Kong Independence (Kaeding, 2017; Kwong, 2009; Veg, 2017). Some studies also argued that domestic political factors such as the deterioration of governance and increasing Chinese influences and socio-economic factors such as economic hardship and social injustice played a vital part in fueling grievances and in increasing popularity of radical groups and extreme nationalist ideology (Dieter, 2019; Kaeding, 2017; Kwong, 2016; Luk 2020b, c; Ma, 2015; Purbrick, 2019; Shek, 2020; Veg, 2017).

The political confrontation first reached its climax in the Occupy Central Movement which occurred in 2014, and the community divided into two oppositions. The conflicting division of moral and political beliefs between two sides placed an underlying socio-political issue in the city (Kennedy, 2015). During the period of 2015 to 2016, some radical right groups spawned after the 2014 Occupy Central Movement (especially the Edward Leung-led Hong Kong Indigenous) organized a series of public disturbances activities named "*Liberate Movements*" that carried political objectives of Hong Kong Independence and anti-mainlander in northern districts of Hong Kong through the means of aggressive actions.

In 2016, an eventful violent clash broke out between law enforcers and independence-supporter resulting in casualties on both sides. Even though the trigger point was originated from a small dispute regarding to law enforcer crackdown on unlawful hawking activities in Hong Kong's Mong Kok district, the pro-independent

groups viewed law enforcement against the hawkers as part of 'cultural cleansing' implemented by the HKSAR Government. Both sides utilized their physical forces to confront the opposite, which was deemed as the first worst outbreak of riot since 1967 Hong Kong riots (The Economist, 2016). The pro-Hong Kong independence radical group – Hong Kong Indigenous – called out the slogan of "*Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times*" to symbolize their course of violent actions.

Then during the 2019 social unrest, the terminology of '*liberation*' and '*revolution*' again was being used as a sacred catchphrase. Students and teenagers were highly involved in organizing and engaging in violent protests, and being frontline soldiers to battle against law enforcers and Blue ribbon (Purbrick, 2019). Luk (2020a), after reviewed the development of social unrest, suggested that mass radicalization caused by the high magnitude of socio-political strains and grievances rooted with strong political agenda had been taken place during the unrest. The sentiment of grievances among the younger generation was even stronger because of the effect of echo chamber in their social networks. His observation was in line with the latest poll result conducted by the HKU Department of Social Work and Social Administration (2020). It had released a poll result named *Political participation and intentions, values and psychological distress of Hong Kong youth* (data collected from January 2020 to April 2020) by using the "Activism and Radicalism Intention Scale" model developed by Moskalenko and Mccauley (2009). It found out that approximately 8.8% of total youth respondents are categorized as radicalists, and 44.4% of total youth respondents agreed on the use of illegal and violent force for achieving the political purposes.

Their high involvement in illegal activities could be reflected by an extremely high arrest rate against teenagers. According to the *Brief Report on Hong Kong's Law and Order Situation in 2019*, there was among 7,549 persons arrested directly related to the unrest, in which 3,091 were reported to be students (40.9% of the total arrested persons), hence the total number of juveniles (aged 10 - 15) and younger persons (aged 16 - 20) arrested for the crime had increased 22.8% (928 cases to 1140 cases) and 69.9% (1841 cases to 3128 cases), compared with 2018 and 2019.

Notably, extreme violent secret radical groups formed by young radicals emerged and proliferated during the unrest. The noteworthy examples were the Black Bloc, Raptor-slayer unit, V-team and Pink-Team, in which their main objective was to develop a paramilitary group that could directly fight against the government by adopting the modus operandi of the Irish Republican Army. The Organized Crime and Triad Bureau under the Police Force Crime and Security Department subsequently launched a series of anti-crime operations since December 2019, specifically targeting these groups. Police had successfully seized a large number of lethal

weapons (such as incendiary bombs, explosives of TATP, petrol bomb, semi-automatic pistol and assault rifle) that were linked to radical anti-government groups (HKSAR Government, 2020a).

Notably, although the involvement in violent extremism is a relatively low-base rate activity (Fazel et al., 2012), the potential threat of domestic terrorism caused by the high magnitude of strains theoretically is correlated and present. Indeed, recent qualitative, quantitative and systematic review radicalization studies shared a common hypothesis and result that high magnitude of subjective and objective grievances and strains played a key role of motivating highly strained person or group of people to engage in violent extremist activities (Agnew, 2010; Al-Badayneh et al., 2017; Lynch et al., 2015; Borum, 2011; Campelo et al., 2018). It is because stress could become a source or catalyst to reduce the effect of constraints regulating a personal behavior by removing a persons' positively valued stimuli and presenting negatively valued stimuli (Agnew, 2010). Delinquent behaviors and criminal acts were one of possible reactive and corrective actions to reduce the feeling of strain and alleviate negative emotions (Agnew, 2002). Campelo et al. (2018) further explained that highly stressed persons in common cases would likely choose the path of delinquency if not associated with a strong ideology; in contrast, they have a higher possibility to take the path of violent radicalization if they contact with any kind of appealing strong ideology that encourages and embraces the use of violence to achieve goals.

These situations have raised a serious alert to the government and public of Hong Kong, as unsolved and continued radicalization could potentially lead to domestic terrorism in the worst-case scenario. Indeed, the Secretary for Security, Mr. John Lee Ka-Chiu, publicly mentioned that Hong Kong was at risk of domestic terrorism (HKSAR Government, 2020b). He made this warning based on the total number of explosive cases in 2019 increased significantly along with the escalation of violent unrest, from 116 cases in 2018 up to 187 cases in 2019, a nearly 60% increase compared with 2018. Hence, in the first quarter of 2020, Hong Kong suffered from a series of bombing campaign that *prima facie* linked to the aforementioned radical anti-bill secret groups that were operating in Telegram platform; hence, the Police Force seized more than two tons of explosive chemicals (including TATP, ANFO, HMTD, DNT and black powder), and arrested 17 people (Han, 2020; HKSAR Government, 2020).

DISCUSSION

It must be noted that (1) the sharp rise in crime figures and delinquencies would result a high amount of cost of crime that could negatively affected economic development and placed financial pressure on criminal

justice system (Heeks et al., 2018; Wickramasekera, 2015), the average cost of crime of every single criminal case was USD \$ 31,000.00 in Hong Kong (Fung, 2018); (2) the mental health issues (especially among younger generation) would generate extra burden on social and public medical cost in both personal and societal level (Busch and Barry, 2007; Kuhlthau et al., 2005). Ni et al. (2020) suggested that it will add up extra 12% public service requirement in Hong Kong); (3) continuing discontent and distrust between government and citizens might indirectly affect the effectiveness of crime preventions that could result in higher crime rate and juvenile delinquency; (4) and political radicalization that might potentially lead to further socio-political polarization, extremism and increasing number of political oriented hate-crime.

Furthermore, the article argues that radicalization and violent political extremism are the utmost critical human and regional security threat and the biggest obstacles for peace development and conflict resolutions in Hong Kong. Firstly, although radical extreme groups were being cracked down, yet it is still unclear whether these groups' members were still highly active or not. Especially, previous studies showed that they often adopted leaderless resistances cum lone-wolf model, theorized by a well-known U.S. far-right leader named Louis Ray Beam Jr., in order to organize hate crime attacks under government surveillance. Since it could secretly recruit like-minded individuals and increase the difficulties of legal prosecution and intelligence detection (Chermak et al., 2011). Secondly, unsolved radicalization could increase the likelihood of future hate crime and terrorism, as they shared a high similarity in nature and statistically correlated (Weilnböck, 2012; Mills et al., 2015); hence thirdly, the possibility of inmate radicalization would be the upcoming major issue. Previous studies had proved that the prison conditions and culture (overcrowding, sub-culture inside prison) can easily create an environment filled with high level of stress against vulnerable inmates, so that extremist ideologies can easily flourish in prison (Hamm, 2008; Mulcahy et al., 2013; Silke and Veldhuis, 2017). All these issues posed a potential threat against the human security; especially Hong Kong has never faced that kind of issues before.

Solving radicalization proliferated by socio-political chaos is not a simple and straightforward work. Even though government of different countries had implemented many resources combating against problem of radicalization and violent extremism, none of them had successfully eliminated its root because of its sophisticated nature that mixes with multi-disciplinary subjects (such as criminology, psychology, sociology, security studies, etc). Indeed, society shall expect it will continue to be rooted in the city for years and have a possibility to advance as political violent extremism, potentially posing serious threat against personal and community security.

These social problems cannot be treated independently and isolated from socio-political context, therefore local community stakeholders and government shall prioritize these issues, as they posed a more direct threat to human security and are deemed as the main obstacle against the city to move beyond the dark shadow of the socio-political saga. Apart from reforming the greater socio-political and economic context, it is suggested that they should formulate multipronged, peace-oriented and sustainable policies that could serve several purposes at once, for the sake of addressing issues step-by-step and time-by-time in a cost-effective manner. For instances, they could focus on community policing enhancement as it is remarkably useful in increasing the level of homeland security through enhancing the effectiveness of crime prevention (solving the increasing crime rate), improving the public relationship between authorities and citizens (regain public trust and relations and governing legitimacy) and even embracing de-radicalization purpose (counter violent radicalization and extremism) (Bayley, 1994; Chappell and Gibson, 2009; Carter and Cater, 2012; Stevanm et al., 2017).

In the nutshell, this article has limitations. It only specifically focused on the personal and community aspects, hence not intended to cover the remaining 5 aspects (environmental, political, economic, food and health). Yet, every element of human security is inter-related and correlated. The unrest did also bring tremendous impacts on political and economic security, for illustration: Gamer et al. (2020) studied how the unrest impacted the local tourism industry before the emergence of COVID-19, and found out that the tourism growth rate dropped to 43.72%, a near-total collapse before the century COVID-19 pandemic; Delisle (2019) explored how the social unrest exposed previous structural political and legal problems between Hong Kong and Mainland China, and explored how it might lead to worsening context of conflicts over local law and politics; Hui (2020) analyzed the hardcore responsive policies used by the Chinese central government and HKSAR Government, and reviewed the political confrontations between the government and protesters and the Blue and Yellow ribbons. It is no doubt that politics did play a huge part in affecting people's security. In order to comprehensively review the human security impacts, future studies should also cover the aspect of political security, studying how the unrest brought dragged Hong Kong into the saga of low (HKSAR and China) and high politics (Sino-US Conflicts) and how these political insecurities affected local people.

CONCLUSION

Mankind history has proved that massive destructive social unrest could bring socio-political problems that eroded the subjective and objective security foundation

and confidence for the local people and even threatened the security of a nation-state. The Hong Kong case seems to be echoed with this hypothesis. Previous studies relating to 2019 social unrest from different professional fields had explored and analyzed the underlying issues that resulted in a broad support of unrest and catalyst of radicalization (Dieter, 2019; Delisle, 2019; Luk, 2020b, 2020c; Ni et al., 2020; Purbrick, 2019; Shek, 2020; Yang and Mak, 2020). Most of them came out with a similar conclusion that was related to structural and long-term socio-economic and political insecurities (such as extreme high income and wealth inequalities, sky-high housing price, degrading living quality, weak social security, cultural and political quarrels between Mainland China and Hong Kong). Yet, it should be noted that solving issues from a macroscopic and structural level takes time and resources, so it is not useful for immediate and short-term conflict resolutions and peacebuilding. Thus, the article's analysis provided a more down-to-earth perspective with the human security framework and concept by focusing on critical personal and community insecurities which arise from the unrest.

The article has specifically covered the category of people and community security and threats. It identified several critical personal and community insecurities and threats, where the government and community stakeholders shall first implement *ad hoc* policies and mobilize resources to address them. These issues were:

(1) Group conflicts and increasing crime rate: The anti-bill social unrest resulted in a rapid increase in crime rate. As of 30th June 2020, 9216 persons were arrested directly related to the unrest. The level of violent conflict ranged from '*police to protesters*' then to '*citizens to citizens*'. Violent activities and hate crime spread over the city. The overall statistic of violent crime (which were criminal damage, arson, theft from vehicle and serious assault) had recorded a significant rise with 9.1%.

(2) The legitimacy issue caused by the distrust among citizens and authorities: The HKSAR Government had lost support from Blue and Yellow sides. The public polling of the popularity of government key officials showed all top-ranked official members suffered historically low scores. Also, citizens had lost confidence and trust in the rule of law system. Nearly 52% of citizens were dissatisfied; hence, 46.7% thought that the public awareness of the rule of law was '*inadequate*'. This negative feedback was directly related to the destructive unrest and the government's failure and policy omissions.

(3) Psychological stresses that endanger public mental health: Apart from physicals and tangible damages, the social unrest had deeply affected the psychological health condition of Hong Kong. The average Hong Kong mental health index and happiness index showed a similar result, where all the index suffered a huge drop to a new low. A post-traumatic stress study warned about the prevalence of probable depress and the prevalence

of PTSD symptoms rose at least 5 times higher compared to previously collected data.

(4) Violent political radicalization that could potentially trigger future serious hate crimes and violent extremism: Hong Kong had already experienced a rising issue of radicalization and threat of far-right ideology before the unrest because of the high magnitude of subjective and objective grievances and strains. During the unrest, the extreme violent confrontation between Yellow and Blue resulted a situation of mass political violent radicalization. Students and teenagers were highly involved in organizing and engaging in violent protests. Extreme violent secret radical groups mainly Black Bloc, Raptor-306 slayer unit, V-team and Pink-Team emerged, and they tried to develop as a paramilitary group by taking reference to the Irish Republican Army. As a result, those groups were being cracked down by police operations, police had seized a large number of lethal weapons that were linked to them. This situation had raised a serious alert to the government and public of Hong Kong, as continued unsolved radicalization could potentially lead to domestic terrorism in the worst-case scenario.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests

REFERENCES

- Agnew R (2010). A general strain theory of Terrorism. *Theoretical Criminology* 14(2):131-153.
- Agnew R (2002). Experienced, Vicarious, and Anticipated Strain: An Exploratory Study on Victimization and Delinquency. *Justice Quarterly* 19(4):603-632.
- Al-Badayneh DM, Alshawi AA, Alhasan K (2017). Strains and Radicalization Among Syrians Youth Refugees in Jordan. *International Journal of Scientific Research* 6(7).
- Alkire S (2003). A Conceptual Framework for Human Security. Working Paper 2. Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.580.2805&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.
- Bayley DH (1994). *Police for the Future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bauhinia Foundation Research Centre (2019). *Shimíngduixiànggǎngfǎzhìhuànguànguàngyijìdiàochá*. [Survey on public perceptions towards the rule of law in Hong Kong]. http://www.bauhinia.org/assets/document/20191218/Full_report_CHT_20191218.pdf (access 17 July 2020)
- Breslin S, Christou G (2015). Has the human security agenda come of age? Definitions, discourses and debates. *Contemporary Politics* 21(1):1-10.
- Borum R (2011). Radicalization into violent extremism II: A review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research. *Journal of Strategic Security* 4(4):37-62.
- Busch H, Colleen L (2008). Mental Health Disorders In Childhood: Assessing The Burden On Families. *Health Affairs* 26(4):1088-1095.
- Campelo N, Oppetit A, Neau F, Cohen D, Bronsard G (2018). "Who are the European youths willing to engage in radicalisation? A multidisciplinary review of their psychological and social profiles. *European Psychiatry* 52:1-14.
- Carter JG, Carter DL (2012). Law enforcement intelligence: Implications for self-radicalized terrorism. *Police Practice and Research* 13(2):138-154.
- Çelebi E, Adam-Troian J, Mahfud Y (2020). Positive Links Between Exposure to Police Violence, PTSD, and Depression Symptoms Among Yellow Vests Protesters in France. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*. P 0886260520935863.
- Chappell AT, Gibson SA (2009). Community policing and homeland security policing: Friend or foe? *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 20(3):326-343.
- Chermak M, Freilich D, Suttmoeller M (2013). The organizational dynamics of far-right hate groups in the United States: Comparing violent to nonviolent organizations. *Studies in Conflict Terrorism* 36(3):193-218.
- DeLisle J (2019). Hong Kong's Summer of Discontent: Another Battle in the Long War over Autonomy, Democracy and the Rule of Law. *Orbis* 63(4):473-504.
- Dieter H (2019). Inequality and social problems in Hong Kong: the reasons for the broad support of the unrest. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 74(4):341-347.
- Fazel S, Singh JP, Doll H, Grann M (2012). Use of risk assessment instruments to predict violence and antisocial behaviour in 73 samples involving 24 827 people: systematic review and meta-analysis. *British Medical Journal* 345:e4692.
- Fung M (2018). The cost of crime [press release]. *CityU Today*, 56. <https://www.cityu.edu.hk/cityutoday/en/ct-56/cost-crime#:~:text=The%20cost%20consists%20of%20expenses,HK%2467%20billion%20in%202016>.
- Gallup (2018). 2018 Global Law and Order. Gallup Inc.
- Gamor E, Nasiri H, Schuckert M (2019). Socio-political Unrest and Tourism Crisis in Hong Kong: A Critical Incident Approach. *Research Papers 12*. Travel and Tourism Association: Advancing Tourism Research Globally
- Greenwood-Reeves J (2020). The Democracy Dichotomy: Framing the Hong Kong 2019 Street Protests as Legitimacy Counterclaims against an Incoherent Constitutional Morality. *Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law* 21(1):35-62.
- Gomez O, Gasper D (2013). Human Security: A thematic Guidance Note for Regional and National Human Development Report Teams. Human Development Report Office. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/human_security_guidance_note_r-nhdrs.pdf (access 10 July 2020).
- Gierszewski J (2017). Human security thinking in practice: 'personal security', 'citizen security' and comprehensive mappings. *Contemporary Politics* 21(1):110-116.
- Guan X, Guo Y (2008). Renlei Anquan: Fenxikuangjijiyingduicuoshi [Human Security: Analytical framework and countermeasures]. *Academia Bimestris* 1:195-200.
- Hamm MS (2008). Prisoner radicalization: Assessing the threat in U.S. correctional institutions. *National Institute of Justice Journal* 261:14-19.
- Han A (2020). Year of living dangerously: Hong Kong bombing campaign 'almost unprecedented', say police explosives unit. *South China Morning Post*. <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3075172/year-living-dangerously-hong-kong-bombing-campaign> (access 7 July 2020)
- Heeks M, Reed S, Tafsiri M, Prince S (2018). Research Report 99: The economic and social cost of crime: second edition. Home Office of the government of United Kingdoms
- HKSAR Government (2020a). Legislative Council Question 1: Weapons seized by Police in recent months and law and order situation in Hong Kong, Press Releases. <https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202001/08/P2020010800638.htm?fontSize=1> (access 9 July 2020).
- HKSAR Government (2020b). Legislative Council Question 2: Preventing emergence of local terrorism. Press Releases. <https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202005/27/P2020052700413.htm?fontSize=1> (access 7 July 2020).
- HKU Department of Social Work and Social Administration (2020). HKU Department of Social Work and Social Administration releases survey findings on Political Participation, Intentions, Values and Psychological Distress among Youth in Hong Kong [Press release]. https://www.hku.hk/press/news_detail_21484.html (access 17 September 2020).
- Hong Kong Police Force (2020a). Overall crime situation: Law and

- Order situation in the first half of 2020. https://www.police.gov.hk/app/messages/?press-release&lang=en&id=P202007290004&fbclid=IwAR3u0MwchP5Ib4eR57ONkG9N9_YSUxjeY2yPe_As4jY400mFDQCG2kQ6cJM Hong Kong Police Force (2020b). Crime Statistic in detail: overall crime, 2010 – 2020. http://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/09_statistics/csd.html
- Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (2020). Popularity of Chief Executive. Hong Kong Public Opinion Program – Survey Results. [https://www.pori.hk/pop-poll/chief-executive/a003/rating\(access 14th September 2020\)](https://www.pori.hk/pop-poll/chief-executive/a003/rating(access%2014%20September%2020))
- Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (2020). Popularity of Principal Officials. Hong Kong Public Opinion Program – Survey Results. [https://www.pori.hk/pop-poll/principal-official\(access 14th September 2020\)](https://www.pori.hk/pop-poll/principal-official(access%2014%20September%2020))
- Hui VT (2020). Beijing's Hard and Soft Repression in Hong Kong. *Orbis* 64(2):289-311.
- Human Security Unit (2016). Human Security Handbook: An integrated approach for the realization of the sustainable development goals and the priority areas of the international community and the United Nations system. United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.
- Joyful (Mental Health) Foundation (2020). *Quángǎngjīngshénjiànkāngzhǐshùdiàochá 2020 [Hong Kong Mental Health Index 2020]*. Xíguàn 3:18-30.
- Kaeding MP (2017). The rise of localism in Hong Kong. *Journal of Democracy* 28(1):151-171.
- Kennedy KJ (2015). Youth Radicalism in Hong Kong: Exploring Changes in Adolescents' Civic Consciousness and Attitudes to the Nation. The Education University of Hong Kong.
- King G, Murray JL (2002). Rethinking human security. *Political Science Quarterly* 116(4):585-610.
- Kuhlthau K, Hill KS, Yucel R, Perrin JM (2005). Financial Burden for Families of Children with Special Health Care Needs. *Maternal and Child Health Journal* 9(2):207-218.
- Kwong Y (2016). State-society conflict radicalization in Hong Kong: the rise of 'anti-china' sentiment and radical localism. *Asian Affairs* 47(3):428-442.
- Kwong Y (2009). The Growth of Localism in Hong Kong: A New Path for the Democracy Movement? *China Perspective* 2016(3):63-68.
- Lam C, Szeto WF, Fong E (2019). General Happiness Index 2019. Social Enterprise Summit's HK WeCare. <http://www.hkwecare.hk/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/香港整體開心指數2019.pdf>.
- Lam J (2020). *Rebel City: Hong Kong's Year of Water and Fire*. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte.Ltd. Singapore.
- Legislative Council of HKSAR (2019). Administration's Paper on Brief Report on Hong Kong's Law and Order Situation in 2019. LC Paper No.CB(2) 644/19-20(03). Panel of Security.
- Lo A (2020). City has the trappings of a failed state. *South China Morning Post*. <https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3050075/city-has-trappings-failed-state> (access 31 July 2020)
- Lo C (2019a). Hong Kong protests: police stop regular foot patrols due to staff crunch and risk of being attacked. *South China Morning Post*. <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-Kong/politics/article/3025140/hong-Kong-protests-police-stop-regular-foot-patrols-due>.
- Lo C (2019b). Burglaries and break-ins soar as Hong Kong Police are left short-handed battling anti-government protests, but crime down 7.2 per cent overall, force says. *South China Morning Post*. <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-Kong/law-and-media> and the evolution and effect of political propaganda in the demonstration camp during the Hong Kong social unrest]. *Bauhinia Tribune* 52:75-82.
- Luk TW (2020b). *Cóngfànzuìxuéjīnzhānglǐlùntàntǎoxiāngǎngfānpànzhūyíjījīnhuà de qīyīnhéchéngxíng [Exploring the Causes and Formation of Hong Kong's Rebellion and Radicalization from the Perspective of Criminological Strain Theory]*. *Bauhinia Tribune* 54: 70-76
- Luk TW (2020c). The 2019 Social Unrest: Revisiting the Pathway of Radicalization in Hong Kong from 2008 to 2012 – an Explorative Approach with General Strain Theory. *Cotemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* 6(3):1163-1206.
- Lynch E, Mason V, Rodriguez N (2015). Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. NCJ 249947. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249947.pdf>.
- Ma N (2015). The Rise of Anti-China Sentiments in Hong Kong and the 2012 Legislative Council Elections. *China Review* 15(1):39-66.
- Marques CF (2020). Hong Kong Is Showing Symptoms of a Failed State. *Bloomberg Opinion Politics and Policy*. <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-02-09/coronavirus-hong-kong-shows-symptoms-of-a-failed-state> (access 31 July 2020)
- Mills CE, Freilich JD, Chermak SM (2015). Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship to Determine Whether They Are Close Cousins or Distant Relatives. *Crime and Delinquency* 63(10):1191-1223.
- Moskalenko S, McCauley C (2009). Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21(2):239-260.
- Muguruza CC (2007). Human Security as a policy framework: Critics and Challenges. *Yearbook of Humanitarian Action and Human Rights* (4):15-35.
- Mulcahy E, Merrington S, Bell P (2013). The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment, Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability. *Journal of Human Security* 9(1):4-14.
- Newman E (2001). Human Security and Constructivism. *International Studies Perspectives* 2001(2):239-251.
- Ni Y, Yao X, Leung SM, Yau C, Leung MC, Lun P (2020). Depression and post-traumatic stress during major social unrest in Hong Kong: a 10-year prospective cohort study. *The Lancet* 395(10220):273-284.
- ParisR (2001). Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? *International Security* 26(2):87-102.
- Purbrick M (2019). A Report of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests. *Asian Affairs* 50(4):465-487.
- Shek TL (2020). Protests in Hong Kong (2019–2020): a Perspective Based on Quality of Life and Well-Being. *Applied Research in Quality of Life* 15:619-635.
- Silke A, Veldhuis T (2017). Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons: A Review of Key Recent Research and Critical Research Gaps. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 11(5):2-11.
- Stevanm W, Younis A, Polutnik C (2017). Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: A process Evaluation in Los Angeles. Final Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
- Tadjabakhsh S (2015). Human security twenty years on. NOREF, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.
- Tadjabakhsh S (2005). Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan. *Les Études du Centre d'études et de recherches internationales Sciences* 117:1-77.
- The Economist (2016). The fire-monkey stirs: Street Violence and Politics <https://www.economist.com/china/2016/02/13/street-violence-and-politics> (access 8 July 2020)
- The Economist Intelligence Unit (2017). *Safe Cities Index 2017*. The Economist.
- UN Development Program (2009). Community security and social cohesion: Towards a UNDP approach. New York, NY: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP
- UN Development Program (1994). *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security*. Oxford University Press.
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2009). *Human crime/article/3035418/burglars-exploiting-hong-Kong-protest-target-homes*.
- Luk TW (2020a). *Xiānggǎngfǎnxīulìshèhuìdòngluànzhōngshìwēizhènyíng de shèmiyùnyònghézhèngzhìwénxuānfāzhāngguóchénghézuòyòng [The use of social security in theory and practice]*. New York, NY: UNOCHA, Human Security Unit.
- Veg S (2017). The rise of localism and civic identity in the post-handover Hong Kong: Questioning the Chinese National-state. *The China Quarterly* 230:323-347.
- Weilnböck H (2012). Hate Crime and Radicalisation: the German political experience and the Schellenberg Report. Special EU

Program Body.
<https://www.niacro.co.uk/sites/default/files/publications/08%20Hate%20Crime%20and%20Radicalisation%20-%20the%20German%20political%20experience%20and%20the%20Schellenberg%20Report.pdf>
Wickramasekera N, Wright J, Elsey H, Murray J, Tubeuf S (2015). Cost of crime: A systematic review. *Journal of Criminal Justice* 43(3):218-228.

Yang X, Mak WS (2020). Addressing sociopolitical determinants of mental health: an emerging challenge in Hong Kong. *The Lancet* 395(10220):249-250.

Full Length Research Paper

Police officers' perceptions about corruption in Zimbabwe: A case of police officers at a University

Tapfuiwa James Katsinde

Department of Peace and Governance, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe.

Received 15 September, 2020; Accepted 5 February, 2021

The study investigated police officers' perceptions about corruption in Zimbabwe. The study was informed by Bourdieu's theory of habitus. A case study design involving a self-administered questionnaire was used to collect data from sixty-four respondents sampled using a census method of sampling. Data was analysed using descriptive statistics and presented on tables and pie charts. The study revealed that police officers were aware of corruption through training, discussions, presentations by bosses and literature. Police officers do not continue to learn about corruption through formal means like workshops. They perceived that corruption existed in the police force; believed that police corruption was due to low salaries, poor working conditions and greediness. Police officers perceived that the existence of corruption in society was due to low salaries, long time in positions of authority and greediness. They also said that corrupt people were usually the rich, the middle class, company owners, top politicians or top management. The factors contributing to corruption in the police force are not due to lack of awareness but relate to power, conditions of service or selfish behaviour or interests. It is recommended that the government improves conditions of service for police officers to reduce corruption.

Key words: Awareness, police officers, corruption, habitus, power, field.

INTRODUCTION

The media in Zimbabwe has carried many stories about police officers being involved in corrupt activities. The Commissioner General of the Police is on record lambasting police officers involved in such activities. Of particular interest are traffic officers who are said to be involved in taking bribes from motorists, sometimes doing that in full view of passengers in buses. Many complaints about the corrupt activities of police officers seem not to have yielded any change. One of the main duties of security forces is to fight corruption. So if people who are

supposed to combat corruption are involved in corruption, who then will help to reduce corruption in the country? Thus, Neild (2007) says about police and corruption, "When those sworn to uphold the law engage in corruption themselves, it saps citizen confidence in democratic institutions- and could foster cynicism toward the notion of democracy itself".

This problem has prompted this research to find out perceptions of undergraduate police officers about corruption at a University in Zimbabwe.

Email: tkatsinde@gmail.com.

Author(s) agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

Statement of the problem

Corruption is a problem in Zimbabwe (Bonga et al., 2015). Corruption in the country has been described as having reached pandemic proportions equating it to the health problems of HIV and AIDS. The problem of corruption in Zimbabwe is similar to what happens in other countries but the difference is that it is worsened by actions or inactions of the police, an institution with a mandate to fight corruption. For example, police officers allegedly receive bribes at roadblocks to let unroadworthy vehicles pass. In addition, sometimes police officers fail to act when corruption cases are reported. Most Zimbabweans perceive the police as the most corrupt institution in the country (Zimbabwe Corruption Report, 2020). So if the police, a government institution, with a mandate to fight corruption fails to adequately fight corruption, who then will do so? Hence, the aim of this research is to find out police officers perceptions about corruption in the country.

DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION

The problem of defining corruption has been noted by many authors (Yerevan, 2000). This is because corruption is found in different forms and hence not easy to find one definition that encompasses various types. But many authors (Yerevan, 2000; Myint, 2000; Frisch, 1996) seem to agree on the definition given by Palmier (1983) that corruption is the use of public office for private advantage or private gain or private ends. The key to this definition is the position a person has. This is because for a person to be corrupt, someone there is an element of one having a certain position which give her or him a certain advantage or privilege. This is shown by Oxford Dictionary definition which says corruption is dishonest or illegal behaviour especially of people in authority.

The concept of corruption has been a point of intrigue since ancient times. For example, Plato's theory of perverted constitutions describes how different types of government are not guided by law but by their own interests. In modern times, ideas on corruption have further been conceptualised by Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau. For Machiavelli, corruption is a process by which the virtue of the citizen is undermined and eventually destroyed. Montesquieu regarded corruption as the dysfunctional process by which a good political order is perverted into an evil one and a monarchy into despotism. Similarly, Rousseau sees political corruption as a consequence of the struggle for power. This is further supported by the famous words of both Rousseau and Acton who say 'all powers tend to corrupt and absolute power corrupts completely.' Fredrich comes in with the idea that corruption is a kind of behaviour which deviates from the norm actually prevalent or behaved to

prevail in a given context such as the political. He goes on to say corruption constitutes a break of law or of standards of high moral conduct (Yerevan, 2000). So if police officers are allegedly involved in corruption it means they are deviating from the duties they are supposed to guard against. It is therefore important for police officers to be aware of corruption and hence the need for this study to find out the extent of this awareness.

Theoretical framework

The study is guided by Bourdieu's theory of habitus with its related concepts of field and capital. Bourdieu (1990:53) defines habitus as "a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures..." Maton (2008:12), taking a cue from Bourdieu's definition, says habitus is "property of actors that comprises a structured and a structuring structure." Nicolaescu and Contemire (2010:14) adds in their own definition of habitus, "a system of dispositions that generate practice and perceptions, a normal or typical, state of appearance of the body." From the three definitions, it can be deduced that habitus is like a person's character from which he/she draws his/her way of acting or bases practices. Bourdieu used the theory of habitus to explain the action of human beings. He said that human action is strategic and practical to that person without referring to it as being subjective or objective. Thus Lizardo (2012:3) argues that habitus is a way to explain social action. Swartz (2002:655) adds that habitus leads to practices of a particular manner of style. Thus the theory of habitus can be used to explain why police officers are allegedly corrupt. Ngarachu (2014:59) says habitus is based on our experience. Pickel (2005:20) adds that habitus is related to power which is an important factor on the problem of corruption.

Power is related to the amount of capital a person has (Beames and Telford, 2013). Bourdieu identified four capitals namely economic, social, cultural and symbolic which are found in any particular field where individuals interact and are involved in various activities. The fields can be social, economic or political (Gennrich, 2015). For example, education/schools are particular examples of social fields. The government and its agencies like the army and police are examples of political fields. Swartz (2002) says that fields are known for production, exchange of goods and services, competition and struggle for power and resources. When various fields interact with each other they do so in terms of the capital they possess. Those with more capital tend to have more influence (Beames and Telford, 2013). When fields interact with each other, they do so on the basis of hierarchy and struggle (Mangez and Hilgers, 2012). A

typical example of such interaction is that of the police, with the power derived from being officers of the government, and public transporters with the economic power they have.

Literature

Research studies on corruption have not been easy to get especially ones that are on Zimbabwe. A report by Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa (2010) showed that Zimbabwean traffic police are more corrupt than those in Botswana and Namibia. The report goes on to say drivers prefer paying bribes to avoid prescribed traffic fines which are more than what they pay to police officers. A report by the Anti-Corruption Trust further shows that bus operators were losing a lot of money to police officers through bribes. Owners of bus companies who attribute the bribery problem to poor salaries paid to civil servants. The aim of this study was to find out from the police officers themselves what they have to say about corruption.

The importance of training was noted by a police officer-in charge of the Rwandan National Police who said training helped to raise awareness about corruption in the force, win confidence of population, fight corruption, cleanse the heart of police of any corrupt tendencies and equip them with ways to fight corruption (Allafrica.com). Similarly, Henriot (2007) also suggests that the values and norms of anti-corruption can be taught in educational institutions as a way of fighting corruption in the same way that HIV and AIDS awareness has been promoted in educational institutions. The aim of this study was to find out whether police officers in Zimbabwe are trained about corruption for awareness purposes.

A study by Anti-Corruption Network (2006) in Tajikistan revealed that there was corruption within the police as some were involved in extortion of money or petrol on roads and inspection of business. In Mozambique, a report by USAID (2005) shows that bribes were used to pass roadblocks. This study in Zimbabwe aims to find whether this is also true by asking the police about the existence of corruption.

Ibrahim (2003) points out that corruption is widespread in Nigeria as indicated by the country being ranked in the top two worst corrupt countries in the Transparency International index. This is aggravated by the fact that state agents who were supposed to fight crime, like the police, were also involved in corrupt activities. Sometimes, they even connived with criminal gangs in corrupt activities. This study intends to find the extent of corruption as seen by the police themselves.

Research questions

a) How do police officers learn about corruption?

b) What are the perceptions of the police officers about corruption in the police force?

c) What are the perceptions of police officers about corruption in the Zimbabwean society?

METHODS

Study site

The study was carried out at a University in Bindura town, the provincial capital of Mashonaland Central. It is to the north-east of Harare and about ninety kilometres from the capital. The original mandate of the university was to train science teachers but it has now diversified to include other disciplines such as commercial, agriculture and social sciences. The department that houses police studies falls under Faculty of Commerce.

Population and sample

The target population were all undergraduate police students in the first, second and third year of training. The students had basic police training for six months who were now enrolled as undergraduate students. After training for Diploma programme, the students worked before enrolling for a degree programme. The total number of the police officers was 75. All were included in the study so the target population became the sample of the study. Of the 75 respondents, five did not want to take part in the study. All the 70 questionnaires distributed were returned. Of the 70 respondents who responded, six were not usable because they did not answer most questions. The actual sample used was 64 which was about 85% of the original targeted population.

Instruments

A questionnaire was used to collect data. The questionnaire was made after reading a number of papers on the topic of corruption. The papers that were of particular importance in designing the questionnaire were research papers by Kerevan and Expert Panel Survey in South Africa. The questionnaire had five sections namely bio data, training, existence of corruption in the police force, existence of corruption in society and police opinions about corruption. Most of the questions were closed type in which respondents were asked to choose from a given choice of answers. The last question asked respondents to give any comment about police corruption in the country. The data was summarised and analysed using descriptive statistics. Data was presented on tables and pie-charts.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Background of respondents

The majority of respondents 56(88%) were males which is an indication that the police force is mainly dominated by males. The views on corruption expressed in this research were mainly from male respondents.

Most of them 42(66%) were in the 26-35 age range which shows that police force is mainly populated by officers in the youth stage.




Figure 1. Training about corruption.

Twenty-eight (44%) have been in the police force for between 6 to 10 years. Twenty (30%) have been in the police for over 10 years. 14(22%) have been police officers for between 1 to 5 years. These figures indicate that the respondents were made up of officers with varied experiences and hence likely to have necessary experiences about corruption at the workplace.

The majority of police officers (78%) work in urban areas with the least (2%) working in farming areas. This is an indication that respondents were mainly from urban centres where corruption is more likely to take place so will provide valuable data on this.

Respondents originate from different provinces in the country but were mainly from four provinces namely Midlands 15(23%), Masvingo 13(20%), Manicaland 7(11%) and Mashonaland East 8(13%). Respondents were from many provinces in the country so their views about corruption indicate ideas from officers originating from different parts of the country.

The respondents work in various provinces with most of them in Harare 26(41%) followed by those from Midlands 7(11%) and Bulawayo 5(8%). Only 4(6%) of the respondents work in Mashonaland Central, the province where the university is situated. Officers who participated in the research work in different provinces in the country so likely to provide varied experiences about corruption.

Learning about corruption

The fight against corruption includes would-be police officers being trained about the problem of corruption. This was pointed out by Chene (2015) who said that police officers should be equipped with skills to perform their duties with integrity and professionalism. In order to find out if respondents were aware of corruption through learning, they were asked if they learnt about corruption, topics covered and if corruption is also covered at the workplace.

Learning about corruption during training

Respondents were asked whether they had learned about corruption during their police training. Most of the police officers 52(81%) said they had while 9(14%) said they did not (Figure 1).

Coverage of topics

Respondents were given a number of possible topics which may be covered on the topic of corruption and asked whether they covered all or not. On coverage of topics, most 42(66%) said they covered all topics




Figure 2. Coverage of topics.

Table 1. Learning about corruption.

Statement	Yes		No		Can't remember		No answer	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Attended workshops on corruption.	21	32.8	33	51.5	1	1.6	9	14.1
Literature on corruption at work.	43	67.2	9	14.1	2	3.1	10	15.6
Received further training on corruption	28	43.8	24	37.5	2	3.1	10	15.6
Bosses talk about corruption.	48	75.0	5	7.8	1	1.6	10	15.6
Discuss corruption with colleagues.	49	76.6	6	9.4	0	0	9	14.1
Mean	38	59	15	23	1	2	10	16

identified, while only 6(9%) said they did not learn any topic on corruption (Figure 2).

Learning about corruption at the workplace

Respondents were asked about learning corruption at the places they worked in terms of workshops, literature, further training, boss talk and discussing with colleagues (Table 1). The results indicate that respondents mainly learn about corruption by discussing with colleagues 49(77%), talking with bosses 48(75%) and literature 43(67%). But there is very little in terms of workshops 21(33%).

The results above revealed that police officers learn about corruption when they are being trained. This is important as corruption is a vice they have to deal with as part of their duties. This is critical as police officers so that understanding of corruption becomes part of their professional socialisation. Even after qualifying, it appears police officers continue to learn about corruption

mainly from others and further training but what is disturbing is that there is little learning using workshops for the majority of respondents. Workshops are important as they assist as prevention programmes by involving stakeholders in the fight against corruption (Langseth, 1999). Other studies (Henriot, 2007) have also shown that learning about corruption is necessary for police officers as it assists them to understand the values and norms of fighting corruption. This was also noted by Allafrica.com (2011) who said that the police force in Rwanda are trained about corruption in order to raise awareness and help fight corruption.

Learning about corruption as done by the police officers is in line with the concepts of habitus and field as theorised by Bourdieu. Warwick et al (2017) argues that the interaction between habitus and field is aided by processes of action learning that forms a social friction which assists learning to take place. This means police officers' secondary socialisation includes learning about corruption which is critical in the government's fight against corruption.



Figure 3. Corruption in the police force.

Table 2. Causes of corruption.

Cause	No.	%
Low salaries	54	84
Greed	38	59
Poor working conditions	40	63
It is now the norm	12	19
No fear of arrest	2	3
No answer	6	9

Existence of corruption in the police force

Chene (2015) says that police corruption exists in various forms such as street-level corruption and bureaucratic corruption. Street-level corruption occurs when police and citizens interact leading to police using their power to get money or sexual favours from the public in exchange for not reporting illegal activities. Bureaucratic corruption refers to the misuse of internal and bureaucratic processes and resources for private gain. In order to find out if police officers were aware of corruption in the police force, respondents were asked if corruption existed in the police force, causes of corruption in the police force, which police officers were more likely to be corrupt, corruption at road blocks and police’s fight against corruption.

Existence of corruption in the police force

Respondents were asked about the existence of corruption in the police force with most of them 49(77%)

saying corruption exists in the police force (Figure 3). Only 2% said there was no corruption in the police force. The others said it was difficult to say or gave no answer.

Causes of corruption in the police force

From a given list of possible causes for corruption in the police force, respondents were asked to identify the three they regarded as important. They cited three main reasons for police corruption: low salaries 54(84%), poor working conditions 40(63%) and greed 38(59%) (Table 2).

Corrupt officers

As regards identifying the rank of officers most likely to be corrupt in the police force, respondents said there was no particular rank that can be said to be corrupt 37(58%). Some said it was an individual affair 10(15%) (Figure 4).




Figure 4. Which officers are corrupt?




Figure 5. Adequacy of fighting corruption.

Police fight against corruption

On whether the police force is doing enough to fight corruption in the country, 40(63%) said not enough was being done (Figure 5). Only 14% said the police was doing enough to fight corruption.

Corruption at roadblocks

When asked about the existence of corruption at some police roadblocks most respondents 50(78%) agreed that

it was practised (Figure 6). Road blocks are common on major roads in Zimbabwe and respondents were asked on reasons for these.

Reasons for police road blocks

When requested to identify any three reasons for police road blocks in the country, respondents identified one that relate to fitness 51(80%), permit 52(81%), passenger capacity 51(80%) and licences 53(83%). Just over half




Figure 6. Corruption at road blocks.

Table 3. Reasons for police roadblocks.

Reason for roadblocks	True no. (%)	False (%)	No answer (%)
To check road fitness of buses	51(80)	9(14)	4(6)
To check road permits	52(81)	7(11)	5(8)
To ensure buses are not overloaded	51(80)	8(12)	5(8)
To get bribes	34(53)	23(35)	7(11)
To check on vehicle licences	52(81)	7(11)	5(8)
To check if drivers have licences	53(83)	6(9)	5(8)

34(53%) of the respondents believed that police officers hoped to get bribes (Table 3).

Initiator of bribes at roadblocks

On who initiates the idea of bribery at road blocks, most of the respondents 41(64%) said it was any of the three: the driver, conductor or the police officer (Figure 7).

The study has also revealed that they were aware of the existence of corruption in the police force as already noted by the Anti-Corruption Network (2006) who identified the police as one of the sectors prone to corruption in Tajikistan. Similarly, surveys cited by Newham (2002) in South Africa show that police corruption existed. It went on to assert that approaches to corruption have now shifted from finding out whether police corruption existed to finding out about the 'size, nature and impact of the problem.' Furthermore, this study has revealed that corruption in police force is a

result of low salaries, poor working conditions and greed. A similar observation was made by Spector et al. (2005) about corruption in Mozambique where low pay and poor working conditions make low level officials more likely to participate in corruption. But if these are the main factors for corruption then it would mean the lowly paid officers would dominate in corruption. Yet this study has revealed that police officers believed every rank in the police force is involved in corrupt activities. A study by Porter and Warrender (2009) shows that both low and high ranked officers are involved in corrupt activities, which perhaps explains why studies in most countries show that corruption, is rampant in the police force. For example, Flanary and Watt (1999) show that the police in Uganda is corrupt despite being an institution expected to fight the vice. Similarly, in Ghana (Fijnaut and Huberts (2002), the police is perceived to be one of the most corrupt institution. The difference between this study and the two studies quoted is that police see themselves as being corrupt while in the other studies they are seen by others




Figure 7. Initiator of bribes.

as corrupt. The evidence therefore corroborates each other. So why do the police continue to be corrupt despite their knowledge about corruption and continued complaints by the public. The answer perhaps lies with what Jain (2001) calls determinants of corruption: "...someone must have discretionary powers... to design regulations as well as to administer them; ... existence of economic rents which can be captured by an identifiable group and a (weak) legal/judicial system which gives low probability for detection for wrong doing." The importance of power is further supported by Rousseau and Acton (Yerevan, 2000) who say that power has a tendency to make people corrupt.

The existence of corruption in the police force shows the importance of power. The police officers whether rich or poor have political power conferred on them by the duties they do. This scenario is explained by Mangez and Hilgers (2012) who used Bourdieu's analytical tool of the field when they said other social fields are subordinate to the field of power. When the police who have power based on government positions interact with other people from other fields, they use their power to induce people to be corrupt for their own benefit. In Zimbabwe, this is exacerbated by the fact that police officers earn low salaries so when they interact with other individuals with more capital they are likely to induce them to be corrupt in order to benefit from them. A good example of such corruption occurs at roadblocks as shown below.

Most police officers said there was corruption that occurs at roadblocks where the act was initiated by the driver, conductor or the police officers. The result is similar to what was said by Thabani (2017) that bribes are common in Zimbabwe. This is an example of personal gain corruption (Porter and Warrender, 2009).

The police officers want to benefit capital from those involved in the transport sector while drivers want to avoid paying more in fines to government coffers or alternatively being taken to court for violating rules of the road. The police are using the power they have for their own benefit, and is an indication that when two fields (police and transport) interact, struggle occurs as each tries to benefit. In this case although both sides appear to benefit, the police officers benefit more as they lose nothing materially while the drivers or conductors representing bus owners lose money in the process. The gain of the transporter and the workers is being let free and they do not face the justice system at the courts.

Existence of corruption in the Zimbabwean society

Respondents were asked if they were aware of corruption in the Zimbabwean society. The majority of respondents 61(95%) said there was corruption in society (Figure 8).

Level of corruption in society

On how many were corrupt, 47(73%) said many people were corrupt (Figure 9).

Who is corrupt in society?

Respondents were asked who they thought was most likely to be corrupt in society. On groups or classes of people who are likely to be corrupt, 48(75%) of the respondents identified the rich middle class, company




Figure 8. Corruption in society.




Figure 9. Level of corruption in society.

owners, top politicians and top management. Only 7(11%) said poor and working class are also corrupt (Figure 10).

Causes of corruption in society

From a list of given factors for corruption, respondents were asked to identify three which they thought were most important. The three factors mostly identified were: low salaries (56%),

long time in positions of authority 23(36%) and greed 20(32%) (Table 4).

The majority of police officers were aware that corruption existed in the Zimbabwean society. This police perception about corruption in Zimbabwe is confirmed by The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (2006) which regards Zimbabwe as a country that has gone down on almost every dimension of governance including corruption. The police officers said people most likely to be corrupt were the rich, middle class, company owners and top management.




Figure 10. Who is corrupt?

Table 4. Causes of corruption in society.

Cause	No. (%)	Position
High costs of goods	4(6)	8
High levels of unemployment	12(19)	5
Greed	21(32)	3
Copying others	3(5)	9
Low salaries	37(56)	1
Long time in positions of authority	25(36)	2
Lack of checks and balances	16(23)	4
Weak laws on corruption	5(8)	7
Political instability	13(19)	5
Few goods on the market	2(3)	10

This finding is corroborated by Gupta et al. (2000) cited by Jain (2001) who say corruption is associated with higher income inequality and by Jain (2001) who asserts that corruption favours the rich. However, Gupta et al. (2000) study also established that there was an association between corruption and poverty. Thus the results suggest that the tendency to be corrupt exist in all classes although it may be more widespread among the privileged classes because of the positions they occupy and the power associated with the positions. This is explained by Bourdieu’s idea of a field which says that “within a field, individuals hold unequal positions and experience unequal trajectories based upon the volume and composition of their portfolio of capital.” (Wacquant, cited in Pather and Chetty, 2015: 59). So when the poor and rich interact, the powerful dominate and take advantage in order to benefit.

The police officers believed that there was corruption in Zimbabwean society because of low salaries, being in positions of authority for long and greediness. These results are similar to results of an Expert Panel Survey (2001) in South Africa which show that some of the main causes of corruption also include greed and desire for self-enrichment and socio-economic conditions. But the main one identified by most respondents was decline in morals and ethics which was not shown by police officers in this study.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study has revealed that most police officers in Zimbabwe are aware of what corruption is. They are also aware that corruption is practised by some police officers

and the existence of corrupt activities in the Zimbabwean society. Police awareness about corruption may not be an answer to fighting corruption but the solution may lie in analysing the power which the police have in doing their work, their conditions of service and tendencies of greediness by officers. The government should try to pay adequate salaries to the police officers so that it reduces the temptation of the police to be corrupt for survival. Furthermore, the government should be tough on officers who are found to be corrupt. In addition, research is recommended on what is being done to curb corruption in the police force in Zimbabwe.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Anti-Corruption Network (2006). Istanbul Anti-Corruption Plan for Tajikistan. OECD, Paris.
- Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa (2010). Mini-Assessment Report: Corruption by Traffic police officers and vehicle drivers in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. <http://actsouthernafrica.posterous.com>
- Bonga WG, Chiminya J, Mudzingiri C (2015). An Explanatory Analysis of the economic social impact of corruption in Zimbabwe. *IOSR Journal Economics and Finance* 6(1):11-20.
- Bourdieu P (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Beames S, Telford J (2013). Pierre Bourdieu: Habitus, field and capital in rock climbing in Outdoor Adventure. <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/pierre-bourdieu-habitus-field-capital-rock-climbing-simon-beames-john-telford/e/10.4324/9780203114773-15>
- Chene M (2015). Zimbabwe: Overview of corruption in the health and education sectors and in local governments. U4 Expert Answer www.U4no10:1-9. Retrieved from <http://www.u4.no/publications/cambodia-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption/>
- Expert Panel Survey (2001). Causes of and Conditions for Corruption in Corruption in South Africa, Chapter 4 Monograph No.65.
- Fijnaut C, Huberts L (2002) Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement in Fijnaut, C and Huberts, L. (eds) in *Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement*. Kluwer Law International, The Hague. pp. 3-34.
- Flanary R, Watt D (1999). The State of Corruption: A case of Uganda. *Third World Quarterly* 20(3):515-536.
- Frisch D (1996). The Effects of Corruption on development. *The Courier ACP-EU* 158:68-70.
- Gennrich AL (2015). Teachers' literate Habitus. PhD Thesis, University of Witwatersrand. Johannesburg.
- Gupta S, Davoodi H, Tiongson E (2000). Corruption and provision of health care and education services. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp00116.pdf>
- Henriot PJ (2007). Corruption in Zambia: Is it inevitable? Can we stop it? Presentation in Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection 2007 Series. Alliance Francaise. Lusaka, Zambia.
- Ibrahim J (2003) Corruption in Nigeria: Transition, persistence and continuity. *The Nigerian Social Scientist* 1(2):3-13
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank (2006/2007). *A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance: Governance Matters- 1996-2006*, Washington. IBRD/World Bank.
- Jain AK (2001). Corruption: A Review. *A Journal of Economic Surveys* 15, 71-121. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00133>
- Lizardo O (2012). *Habitus: Classical sources of the concept*. University of Notre Dame.
- Mangez E, Hilgers M (2012). Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of Social Fields in Hilgers, M. & Mangez, E. *Bourdieu's theory of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications*. Routledge Advances in Sociology P 1.
- Maton K (2008). Habitus in Grenfell, M (Ed) *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, London, Acumen pp. 49-65.
- Myint U (2000). Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Cures. *Asia Pacific Development Journal* 7(2):33-58.
- Neild R (2007). *Anti-corruption and Police Integrity*. USAID Program Brief. Virginia.
- Newham G (2002). *Tackling Police Corruption in South Africa*. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
- Ngarachu FW (2014). Applying Pierre Bourdieu's Concept of Habitus and Field to the Study of Ethnicity in Kenya. *Journal of Language, Technology and Entrepreneurship in Africa* 5(1):57-69.
- Nicolaescu C (2010). Bourdieu- Habitus, Symbolic Violence, The Gift: "You Give/I Give You" Principle. *Euromentor Journal* 1(3):276-284.
- Pather S, Chetty R (2015). The Habitus and Social Capital of First-Year Students: A Case Study. *Alternation Special Edition* 17:57-76
- Pickel A (2005). *The Habitus Process: A Biopsychosocial Conception*. Working Paper, CSGP05/1, Trent University. www.trentu.ca/globalpolitics
- Porter LE, Warrender CA (2009). Multivariate model of police deviance, examining the nature of corruption, crime and misconduct. *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy* 19(1):79-99.
- Spector BI, Schloss M, Green S, Hart E, Ferrel T (2005). *Corruption Assessment Mozambique*, USAID, Washington.
- Swartz DL (2002). The Sociology of Habit: The Perspective of Pierre Bourdieu. *The Occupational Therapy Journal of Research*, Volume 22, Supplement.
- Nyoni T (2017). The curse of corruption in Zimbabwe. *International Journal of Advanced Research and Publications* 1(5).
- USAID (2005). *Corruption Assessment: Mozambique – World Bank 16 Dec- Final Report*. <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/MozambiqueCorAsm.pdf>
- Warwick R, McCray J, Board D (2017). Bourdieu's habitus and field: implications on the practice and theory of critical action learning. *Action Learning: Research and Practice* 14(2):104-119.
- Yerevan FV (2000). A study of the Effects of Corruption on Economic and Political Development of Armenia. A Master's Thesis, American University of Armenia. Armenia.
- Zimbabwe Corruption Report (2020). May <https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/zimbabwe/>

Review

The post genocide reconciliation in Rwanda: Erasing ethnicity and building citizenship

Ouafaa RAFI

Paris Sciences et Lettres Research University (PSL), France.

Received 10 March, 2021; Accepted 4 May, 2021

The Rwandan genocide, seen as the result of years of ethnic antagonization and segmentation, was followed by a political effort leading to the restructuration of Rwandan national identity in order to unify the society and eventually achieve national reconciliation. By implementing measures such as the removal of ethnic affiliation on national identity documents, or by reforming the national education curriculum, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RFP), governing the country since 1994 under the leadership of the President Paul Kagame, aimed at the progressive obliteration of the ethnic frame of references in the Rwandan society. Therefore, the aim of this study is to analyze the dynamics of obliteration of the ethnic factor in the Rwandan state narrative and to study, under a multidimensional lens, the post-genocide nation-building processes.

Key words: Ethnicity, ethnic denialism, genocide, nation building, civic transition.

INTRODUCTION

The study of the causes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, that led to between 800000 and a million victims, has been subjected to a memory war, a conflict between opposed interpretations of historical events and dynamics.

This memory war not only tackles the immediate causes of the genocide, it is to say the death of the Hutu president Habyarimana in 1994, but also the more profound sources of ethnic segmentation in Rwanda and Burundi. Hence, a veritable conflict opposes the proponents of the constructivist thesis, imputing the responsibility of ethnic segmentation to the colonizing powers such as Belgium and Germany, and the proponents of the primordialist approach, recognizing the authenticity of ethnic construct in Rwanda using the Hamitic hypotheses. The exacerbation of the constructivist thesis is epitomized by the post-genocide

Rwandan state that became a champion of ethnic denial emphasizing the colonial impact on ethnic segmentation and its absence prior to colonialism.

The Hamitic thesis were based on a primordial approach of ethnicity linked to what Kaplan (2005) calls the Ancient Hatreds, describing the identities as fixed and becoming a basis for political mobilization. Hamitic hypotheses rely on the affirmation of biological differences between ethnic groups and the highlighting of physical distinctions stemming from different genealogical lines. This conception of ethnicity places the ethnic lines as nodal points of the individuals lives and this will be the case particularly after the independence of Rwanda in 1961. Indeed, Tilly (2002) differentiated between the detached identities, which are the identities that are not experienced on a daily basis and the embedded identities,

E-mail: rafiouafaa@gmail.com.

Author(s) agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

the identities invoked in daily practices. The task of the post-genocide RFP government would be hence to transform the embedded ethnic identities into detached identities, which is the first step for their complete annihilation as they will progressively be replaced by nation state related identities.

Ethnic identity is a matter of self-description and of ascription, highlighting the individual and collective dynamics in its constitution and the evolving assignation of identity. Hence, in the case of Rwanda, it is clear that ethnic ascription played an important role since the colonial powers interfered in the ethnic segmentation. According to Newbury (1998), the colonial powers misinterpreted the ethnic composition of Rwanda by considering the social segmentation as an ethnic segmentation and overemphasized on the ethnic division of the social importance of these divisions. As described by Newbury (1988), the European colonial powers had an image of Rwanda (and Burundi) as having a marked social hierarchy accompanied by an “extraordinary political centralization”. The great part of the first European descriptions of Rwanda comprised an emphasis on the ethnic duality, with the light skinned and tall Tutsi, associated with power and pastoralism, in contrast to the more dark-skinned Hutu, associated with servitude. However, as underlined by Newbury (1988) this vision contrasts with the reality of ethnic identities that were not primordial but were contextually created.

Hence, according to historian King (2013), the post-genocide Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) state will propel a theory of the precolonial golden age in which ethnic conflicts were absent. This theory of precolonial golden age was reinforced by the work of scholars such as Christian (2010) that highlighted the peculiarity of ethnicity of Rwanda since patrilinear and hereditary identifications do not correspond with a linguistic, cultural or geographic differentiation. Additionally, Christian (2010) defined the ethnic categories as social categories, with the Tutsi being the wealthier and powerful in contrast to the Hutu. In this view, the social upgrading and downgrading is possible, meaning an intercommunication between the different social classes.

HENCE, WHAT ARE THE MAIN CHALLENGES RWANDA FACES IN ITS TRANSITION FROM AN ETHNIC-BASED SOCIETY TO A CIVIC-CITIZENSHIP SOCIETY?

By answering this research question, the aim of this paper was to deconstruct the nation building strategy of the post-genocide Rwanda led by Paul Kagame and the FPR regime. Moreover, the methodology of the research was multidisciplinary, as it connected different disciplines to offer a broader and more complete overview of the situation, incorporating elements from economy, sociology and historiography in the observation of the Rwandan

case. In addition, there was an attempt to relativize the success of the outcomes of this policy by applying a methodological critique particularly directed towards the authoritarian power of Kagame.

Most of the literature evoking the Rwandan case emphasizes the genocide shift and the construction of a civic identity disconnected from ethnic belonging, notably with a comparison with Burundi that has adopted ethnic accommodation measures. However, most of these works adopted a unidimensional socio-political approach, without examining the historiographical and educational features. Moreover, there is a lack of literature connecting nation-building to economic performances or underlining economic success as an incentive for collective unification. In this research, the goal was to connect historiography, political sociology, economy and social psychology to reveal trends inherent to nation-building, collective trauma, collective motivation by economic incentives or paternalistic politics crisscrossing and forming the peculiarity of the Rwandan case.

A STATE LED AND TOP-DOWN PROCESS OF NATION-BUILDING

The post-genocide Rwanda is an authoritarian state. As defined by Linz (1975) authoritarianism is a regime of limited pluralism, which, in contrast to totalitarian regimes, will not have the aims of homogenizing the population under a single political project and will tolerate a limited opposition that will not pose a threat to the authoritarian grasp on power. The president Paul Kagame is in power since 1994 and has since then progressively consolidated its rule by developing a repressive state apparatus that is constituted by an array of coercive and limitative elements such as prison, a corrupted judiciary system targeting political opponents and the omnipotence of the Kagame affiliated elite on the political life.

Indeed, the regime developed ideological state apparatuses which are according to Althusser (1965) intangible ideological assets vehiculated by medias, school or culture. The ideological state apparatus of the Rwandan regime will notably be based on a conditioning of the population through the transmission of state-controlled ideals such as nation, ethnic denialism and genocide consciousness. The Rwandan case is significant in its propension to show the dynamics of nation-building in a deeply divided society, and it might be relevant to compare this case to Gellner's (1983) constructivist analysis of nationalism, highlighting the anteriority of nationalism over the nation. Therefore, in the Rwandan case, the government will propel a state-led process of construction of nationalism around the idea of "Rwandanness" which was not pre-existent to the state, as political unit to enable the construction of an inclusive national idea. Kagame and FPR regime will then have a discourse based on the artificiality and constructed nature

of the ethnic divisions in Rwanda.

Hence, post-genocide Rwanda will follow a trajectory that was described by Hobsbawm (1992) as the transition from a vertical top-down domination to a horizontal solidarity based on civil religion and citizenship. The preamble of the 2003 Rwandan constitution is archetypal of this trajectory as it mentions that Rwandans “enjoy the privilege of having one country, a common language, a common culture and a long-shared history which ought to lead to a common vision of our destiny.” The state based its reconstruction policy on the annihilation of ethnicity, and according to Vandeginste (2014), contrarily to Burundi, Rwanda did not develop a consociational Lijphartian state based on the accommodation of ethnic differences, but a state based on an integrationist policy, it is to say a policy obliterating ethnicity as a source of political mobilization. Indeed, in Burundi, the ethnicity is a central factor of political mobilization and is mentioned for every electoral candidate. In contrast, in Rwanda, the chosen amnesia of ethnicity will be reinforced by the kind of centripetal power-sharing arrangements that are not ethnic-related but are based on proportionality, quotas, and coalitions trying to bridge ideological and not ethnic gaps.

Therefore, the efforts of the state will be to reposition the political competition on the ideological field and not ethnic field. Moreover, according to Vandeginste (2014), Rwanda’s political system is based on the importance given to power mitigation and consensus as for instance, even majoritarian parties cannot claim more than 50% of the seats and the president and the speaker of the parliament must not pertain to the same party.

HIJACKING NARRATIVES AND MEMORY: EXAMINING THE COLONIAL IMPACT AND FOSTERING ETHNIC AMNESIA

Cooper (1996) highlighted the processes of nation-building subsequently to colonization, talking about national movements that were not constructed on a horizontal affinity corresponding to a certain imagined community as described by Anderson (1983), but constructed on vertical ties, on patron to client ties showing the exacerbation of the ethnic segmentation. Moreover, Cooper (1996) underlined the weakness of post-colonial states, struggling to achieve a nation-state unity. Therefore, the absence of nation-state unifying the citizens under a unique identity will lead to a growing importance of concurrent status identities (Berman B, Dickson E, Will Kymlicka, 2004) This post-colonial development will lead to what Ekeh (1975) calls the “two publics in Africa”, meaning that the public realm will be divided in a realm influenced by primordial and ethnic groupings, and of an amoral civic public realm that will therefore be deprived from the moral imperatives characterizing the first realm. This process will hence curb the attempts to achieve a unified citizenship as the same political actors

are simultaneously operating in the primordial and in the civic publics.

As underlined by Vidal (2004), the Rwandan state will stage a work of collective mourning embedded in a larger process of memorization of the genocide epitomized by the ritualized public commemorations. The state narrative has hierarchized the victims in a selective manner, with the Tutsi victims being the central victims of the genocide, then moderate Hutus, and finally collateral victims of the post-genocide war. Hence, according to Vidal (2004), there was a criticism of the regime politics as being a form of political recuperation and instrumentalization of the disaster. This trend was epitomized significantly by the exhibition of the genocide’s victims’ cadavers beginning from 1996, which was contrary to the Rwandan funerary traditions. Vidal (2004) talks also about a forced memorization (Macron, 2000) and the constitution of an official history of the genocide, which was used in order to build a community and to propel the bases of a unification of the nation. Indeed, according to Renan (1887), a nation is based on a common and collective understanding of the past, the history of the country is selectively appropriated by the nationalist project.

Moreover, according to Korman (2014) there have been undoubtedly a memory competition since the victory of the FPR was also concomitant with the end of the genocide. Hence, the first years of FPR rule were characterized by this coincidence between a solemnity linked to the genocide loss but also a certain euphoria because of the triumphant victory of the FPR that progressively depicted itself as the savior of a lost country. The legitimation of the FPR and of Kagame rule is hence still embedded in this logic of providential action, which can be compared to a charismatic legitimacy as described by Weber (1968), since it is based on the heroic actions of an individual and of their personal authority.

UNITY THROUGH AUTHORITARIAN MEANS: A PARADOXICAL PROCESS?

According to Mamdani (2004), the independence of previously colonized countries should be the birth of a deracialized state. In Rwanda, the formal independence in 1962 did not lead to the un-ethnicization of political and social relationships, which lead to the progressive representation of 1994 as the real independence year of Rwanda. The Kagame narrative represents 1994 as a national liberation, as the year 0 of the Rwandan state, as a *Sattelzeit* (Koselleck, 1997), a bridging period in which discontinuity coincides with transition.

The new departure of the Rwandan nation can be exemplified by the organic law of the genocide, limiting the judicial suing to crimes that happened between October 1990 and December 1994. This temporal limitation is constraining the potential extrapolations of

the judicial system that was already overwhelmed in 1994. Moreover, by limiting the temporal frame of the crimes, the regime made it easier to close the genocide hunt and to subsequently outsource the condemnation process to popular courts, the gaccacas, favoring a grassroots conception of national reconciliation. Moreover, another way to create a unificatory citizenship is to shed light not on the genocide, but on the FPR victory. Hence, the quintessential archetype of this trend is the choice of the venue of the first commemoration of the genocide, the 7th of April 1995, in Rebero which was the place not of Tutsi massacres, but of the military victory of the FPR after intense fights in 1994.

However, can the authoritarian means of the integrationist nation building be conciliated with the authoritarian means of its practical application?

The authoritarian means by which the post-genocide state led to the unification of the state were linked to the urgency of the constitution of a unified nation in a deeply divided society. Therefore, the depth and the strength of the ethnic segmentation of society could only be countered by an authoritarian takeover for the greater good. The ethnic segmentation of Rwanda was even more complex and embedded in the mentalities since the dialectical enmity relationship of the two main ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi, was influencing the identity conception of each group. In this case, it is worth mentioning the theory of "looking glass self-effect", as underlined by Cooley (1967) and by which a group is self-defined through the image another group has of it.

Hence, the Kagame regime can be considered as a Paternalistic regime, that is according to Kant and Proust (1784) a regime mimicking the behaviors and features of a familial structure and in which the leader is compared to the father of the nation. Paul Kagame is seen as the father of the Rwandan nation; his decisions are presented as incontestable since he is presented as having an unlimited knowledge of the needs of the population and of the decisions he must take to enable the development of Rwanda. Consequently, the Rwandan regime is a paternalistic regime in which the leader incarnated the nation, with Incarnation being opposed to Representation, which can be described to Schmidt's (1938) typology of political processes. The incarnation of the Rwandan population by Kagame makes it possible to take unilateral decisions in the name of the society without necessarily consulting it.

THE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE RWANDAN RENAISSANCE AS UNIFYING

The main example of this paternalistic trend is without any doubt the state leadership on the economic spheres, with a developmentalist approach reflecting a monopoly of the state on the economic guidelines.

The Rwandan state's proactivity in terms of economic planning and reform can be compared to a form of

Shapership. This notion as developed by Frankfort and Baudoin (2019) describes the ability of a leader to shape future projects and a new organization of the society. President Kagame started a form of Shapership subsequently to the genocide to draw strategies to develop Rwanda. The ambitions of the Kagame Shapership can be aligned to the notion of a manifest national destiny. Renan (1887) in "what is a nation?" describes the logics of the unification of a nation after a shared misfortune and subsequently its unification around a prophesized and expected better future. Renan (1887) even describes the shared woe as a stronger unifier for the nation than a shared joy. Hence, as described by Amougou (2019), the Rwandan nation has been unified by a collective misfortune epitomized by the genocide but also by the perspective of collective fortune symbolized by the FPR efforts to develop the nation.

The construction of idealized future perspectives is epitomized by the economic growth seen as the Rwandan renaissance. The incredible progresses of Rwanda in terms of economic performance led to the term "Rwandan economic miracle", represented notably by the 7.5% of average annual growth the last 10 years (from 2008 to 2018, World Bank). Moreover, the economic success of Rwanda is depicted as transgressing ethnic categories and can foster a sense of commonality since the interests of the population in the economic renaissance are shared. Furthermore, because of this economic success, considering the recent performances as the "Rwandan economic miracle", Kagame started benefiting from a legal rational legitimacy, that is according to Weber (1922) emanating from the rational strategies of the regime favouring economic development, bureaucratic structuration and respect of private property laws. Hence, there is a shift from a charismatic leadership to a legal rational leadership that is at the same time internal and external, since the Kagame regime benefits from a great support from international organizations such as the World Monetary Fund or the World Bank.

In addition, the developmentalist approach of the Rwandan economic projects is based on the centrality of education to achieve the growth goals. The objectives of the regime are to foster a new generation of Rwandans conscious of their national identity and of their responsibility in forging the Rwanda of tomorrow and these efforts were constituted through education, with history and civic education course. The youth of the Rwandan population, with an average age of 20 years, is a regularly underlined element, since 60% of the population was born after the genocide.

A TOP-DOWN NATIONAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION?

Notable are the progresses that Rwanda has made in terms of national unity and economic development, however the strategy of the President Kagame regime can be qualified as inherently paternalistic. Since 1994,

the regime started to implement policies corresponding to its own vision and project of the society. It is clear that in this case, the contribution of the civil society and population in the decisions was minimal, which will make that the population will undergo the decisions rather than participate in the elaboration of the nation state ideals. Hence, because of this top-down policy, the internalization of the national citizenship ideas may be inferior to the one using a greater participation of the population in its elaboration and implementation.

Furthermore, according to McCrudden and O'Leary (2013), the ethnic amnesia integrationist citizenship model is sometimes only a figurehead for a secularized version of the dominating ethnic group's rule. Therefore, under the guise of the disappearing of ethnic segmentation, the Rwandan political model could be a regime of Tutsi FPR omnipotence, with Paul Kagame being the recipient of power. Therefore, even if many efforts were made in order to promote consensus and power mitigation in the elected offices, it could be a cosmetic façade. Indeed, Rwanda is often described as an authoritarian rule in which the president, Paul Kagame, has an overwhelming power limiting the role of the elected individuals. Consequently, the perceived power accommodation and centripetal conception of the Rwandan political regime is not the reality as the power is in fact accumulated by a small circle of people, including the president, Paul Kagame. Amnesty International repeatedly criticized the Kagame regime for its use of the anti-genocide laws against potential political opponents.

In addition, on another level, there is an apparent disconnection between the FPR elite and the population since according to Reyntjens (2013), the FPR elite emanates mainly from the urban circles, from the capital Kigali and from the diaspora, the president Kagame himself was living in Belgium until 1994. Hence, this elite may not have a knowledge of the practical and deep impact of ethnicity on the non-urban population and will apply a kind of wishful thinking abolishing ethnicity without fathoming its persisting importance.

ETHNIC DENIALISM VERSUS ETHNIC PERSISTENCE

Recognizing the constructed nature of the ethnic group and denying ethnic divisions is sometimes criticized as it forgets that ethnicity had major impacts on the lives of Rwandans and still has some reverberations as the genocide may have provoked an increased Tutsi solidarity and consciousness. The desire to operate a tabula rasa of the past as epitomized by the absence of mentions to ethnic groups in the 2003 Constitution is hence difficult and shows a lack of knowledge of the Rwandan society.

According to King (2014), obliterating ethnic groups is contrary to the reality of the country in which ethnicity is still a structuring element of the social life of individuals. The state efforts will be hence to project an image of

Rwanda with a unified civic identity and with geographical cultural differences but with a weakening and progressive obliteration of the importance of the ethnic frame of reference in social, political and economic life. As underlined by Wielenga (2014) resistance to the state project of unification of Rwandans will be to speak in ethnic terms, that is, stereotyping and othering, as epitomized by the labelling by some Rwandans of the politician Frank Habineza as a "mountain gorilla", referring to his Hutu origins.

Furthermore, according to Chrétien (2018), the whole process of ethnic strengthening in Rwanda, from the colonization to 1994 was based on historical, religious, feudal and colonial discourses that contributed to give to the Hutu Tutsi duality an apparent historicity. The mechanisms of historicization of the ethnic divide can be compared to the process of Invention of Tradition, as described by Ranger and Hobsbawm (1992), giving historical legitimization to newly established dynamics.

Therefore, the Rwandan state is placing itself in a position of ethnic denialism and consequently, as it denies the persistence of ethnicity in the society, it cannot fight against the facets of ethnic enmity that still impact the lives of Rwanda. According to Ange Muyazaki¹, a genocide survivor, there is still an inter-ethnic enmity in Rwanda that could not be tackled because of the position of ethnic denialism of the state.

Moreover, the logical hierarchy of victims establishing the Tutsi as the primary victims of the genocide is contested in Rwanda. As seen by Vidal (2004), the first national union government, gathering members from different ethnic groups, split in August 1995 because of the departure of many Hutu ministers, such as the Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, because of the inherent tensions linked to the memorization and to the taboos linked to the Hutu victims' status. Even after the October 2000 National summit on Unity and Reconciliation, this issue of the right of mourning was not solved. According to Korman (2014), the expression *Itsembabwoko n'itsembatsemba* meaning genocide and massacres is directly and primarily linked to the Tutsi massacres that are the only ones having the naming of Genocide. Fidèle Ndayisaba, executive secretary of the Unity and Reconciliation National Commission (NCUR) said that Hutu families can remember and honor the memory of their dead, but they should not in any case try to compare these deaths to the genocide victims.

THE COMPETITIVE VICTIMHOOD AND NEGATIONISM ISSUES

By establishing a hierarchy of victims of the genocide, some tendencies of competitive victimhood can be noticed, especially used by Hutus that were even tempted to employ a negationist rhetoric.

As explained by Chaumont (2010), competitive victimhood is symptomatic of the Age of Victimhood in which

being a victim is socially gratifying as this status offers new opportunities. According to Andrighetto (2012), the question of the coexistence of 1 Conference of Ange Muyazaki, Sciences Po, May 2019 different social entities with a legacy of "mutual violence, humiliation and abuse" cannot be solved by formal agreements since the persisting feelings of distrust and motivations for revenge could provoke what Nadler (2002) calls an endless cycle of violence. Competitive victimhood in this context is the competitive and escalating claim of concurrent groups to have suffered more than the others which leads to the persistence of enmity between the groups. In the Rwandan case, the Tutsi, claiming to have suffered of the genocide may be countered by some Hutus trying to use a rhetoric paralleling the Tutsi genocide to the FPR killings during the war.

As described by Mugiraneza (2009) after the end of the genocide, the answer of the former killers was to negate and to have a relativist stance on the massacres. Negation is therefore seen as a weapon to avoid the prosecutions but also to negate the status of victim given to the Tutsis and claim it. As underlined by Noor et al. (2008), the status of victim is presented as a provider to a preferential access to valuable resources such as legitimacy and political power, and there is a competition from some actors to attain the victim status. The rise of negationist trends can be seen by some actors as a way to present themselves as the victims of the writing of history and is intertwined with conspiracy theories narrating how the victimization of a group leads to their domination over the society.

The exhibition of the cadavers of the genocide's victims in memorials can be seen as a way to counter the skepticism of the negationists, as they are considered as the proof of the sufferings inflicted in the name of ethnic supremacy. Therefore, the process of memorization of the genocide, notably with the memorial of genocide of Gisozi, will be part of the state array designed to raise awareness of the dangers of ethnic segmentation. The Gisozi's memorial was inspired by the Holocaust memorial model and designed based on a memorial mimicry as many Yad Vashem memorial officials from Jerusalem were solicited in the conception of the memorial. Therefore, the forced memorization of the genocide by the state led to an official history aiming at forging a collective consciousness. This type of official history is according to Rousso and Goldhammer (1991) "dependent upon the expectations of the present".

CONCLUSION

The research conducted in this article highlighted the fact that the mismatch of reality and state perceptions may lead to the obliteration of challenges that impact the population. The question of ethnic persistence in Rwanda is therefore an important case study showing the transition from a model of ethno-nationalism to a model of

civic nationalism.

Hence, even if the elite's conception of Rwanda doesn't correspond to the reality, the approach of ethnic denialism may contribute to lower the role of ethnicity in the country. Indeed, the approach of Consequentialism, as developed by Berger and Luckman may explain these dynamics since it considers, in the sociological field, that beliefs, even if they are not real, may be real and tangible in their consequences. Therefore, the state conception and implementation of the negation of ethnicity may have impacts even if it doesn't correspond to the real state of society.

Moreover, the efforts of Rwanda will be to project internationally the image of an appeased society without any ethnic referential. The theory of state branding, as developed by Van Ham (2010) could be consistent to analyze how Rwanda is trying currently to create a state image based on the portrayed national reconciliation and on the extraordinary economic renaissance.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Althusser L (1965). Lire "Le Capital". Maspero Paris.
- Amougou T (2019). Le modèle rwandais remet en lumière les questions sur le développement en Afrique. *Le Monde Afrique*.
- Anderson B (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. revised edition, London: Verso. *Cyber Conflict and Global Politics* P 212.
- Andrighetto LL (2012). The victim wars: how competitive victimhood stymies reconciliation between conflicting groups. *The Inquisitive Mind* P 13.
- Berman B, Dickson E, Will Kymlicka eds (2004). *Ethnicity and democracy in Africa*. Ohio University Press.
- Chaumont JM (2010). *La Concurrency Des Victimes: Génocide, Identité, Reconnaissance*. La Découverte, Paris.
- Chrétien JP (2018). *Le Défi De l'Ethnisme: Rwanda Et Burundi*. Éditions Karthala, Paris.
- Christian JP (2010). The Adventures of Historical Consciousness in Rwanda. *Spirit* 5:103-121.
- Cooley CH (1864-1929). *Human Nature and the Social Order*. Schocken Books, New York, 1967.
- Cooper F (1996). *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 89.
- Ekeh P (1975). Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical A theoretical statement. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17(1):91-112.
- Frankfort A, Baudoin JL (2019). *Shapership: l'art de donner forme au futur*. Marque belge.
- Gellner E (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
- Hobsbawm EJ (1992). *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press.
- Kant I, Proust F (1784). *Vers La Paix Perpétuelle; Que Signifie s'Orienter Dans La Pensée ? Qu'Est-Ce Que Les Lumières?*
- Kaplan RD (2005). *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History*. Picador, New York.
- King E (2013). *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Korman R (2014). "The Rwandan state and the memory of the

- genocide. Twentieth century. *History Review* 2:87-98.
- Koselleck R (1997). *L'Expérience De l'histoire*. Éditions Gallimard.
- Linz JJ (1975). *Régimes totalitaires et autoritaires*. Armand Colin, 2007.
- Macron E (2000). "La Lumière Blanche Du Passé: Lecture De "La Mémoire, l'Histoire, l'Oubli" De Paul Ricoeur." *Esprit* (1940). pp. 16-31.
- Mamdani M, Copans J, Copans M (2004). *Citoyen Et Sujet: L'Afrique Contemporaine Et L'Héritage Du Colonialisme Tardif*. SEPHIS, Amsterdam; Paris.
- McCrudden C, O'Leary B (2013). *Courts and Consociations: Human Rights Versus Power-Sharing*. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Mugiraneza A (2009). *Négationisme Au Rwanda Post-Génocide*. *Revue d'Histoire De La Shoah* 190(1):285-298.
- Newbury C (1988). *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860- 1960*. Columbia University Press, New York.
- Newbury C (1998) . *Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda*. *Africa Today* 45(1):7-24.
- Renan E (1887). *Qu'Est-Ce Qu'Une Nation?* In: *Renan, Discours et Conférences*, Calmann Levy.
- Reyntjens F (2013). *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Rousso H, Goldhammer A (1991). *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944*. Harvard University Press, London; Cambridge, Mass.
- Ricoeur Paul (2003). *La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Schmitt C Günter M, François P, Danilo Z (1938). *Guerre Discriminatoire Et Logique Des Grands*.
- Tilly C (2002). *Stories, Identities, and Political Change*. Rowman and Littlefield Publ, Lanham, Md.
- Van Ham P (2010). *Social Power in International Politics*. Routledge, New York.
- Vandeginste S (2014). *Governing Ethnicity after Genocide: Ethnic Amnesia in Rwanda Versus Ethnic Power-Sharing in Burundi*. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8(2):263-277.
- Vidal C (2004). *La Commémoration Du Génocide Au Rwanda: Violence Symbolique, Mémorisation Forcée Et Histoire Officielle (the Commemoration of the Genocide in Rwanda: Symbolic Violence, Compulsory Memorization and Official History)*. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 44(175):575-592.
- Weber M (1968). *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Bedminster Press, New York P 1.
- Weber, Max (1922). *1946 Bureaucracy*. Pages 196–244 in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Wielenga C (2014). *Lived' Identities in Rwanda - Beyond Ethnicity?* *Africa Insight* 44(1):122-136.

Full Length Research Paper

Indigenous knowledge of conflict resolution for transformative peace building: Amare of Jama Woreda, Amhara - Ethiopia

Kefelegn Tesfaye

Department of Civics and Ethical Studies, College of Social Sciences and Humanities, Bule Hora University, Hagera Mariam, Ethiopia.

Received 5 October, 2018; Accepted 22 February, 2019

The paper focuses on the role of indigenous knowledge system in the quest for conflict resolution and sustainable peace building. The data were collected from key informants, in-depth interview, focus group discussion, and document analysis. To this end, purposive sampling is used to select the participants. The finding has revealed the existence of many local and community based customary practices and indigenous conflict resolution institutions. Among them is the Amare Council of Elders a well-known and formally recognized mediation and reconciliation mechanism to deal with range of conflicts from simple disputes to horrifying murder acts. There are customary practices and ritual cleansing ceremonies used by Amare in blood feud reconciliation and non-homicide. The prominent ways and modes that have been practiced by Amare conciliators in mediation and blood feud reconciliation include Bele (a kind of swearing to do or not to do something), Arami (a payment from murderer's family to temporarily calm the issue until Guma will pay) and Guma (blood price during reconciliation). Nevertheless, from transformative peace building perspective, as per the finding currently Amare Shimglina is imperceptible due to the challenges emerged from the community, formal justice actors and conciliators themselves. As a result of these, the paper suggests the need to empowerment and up-keeping of indigenous knowledge systems of conflict resolution for developing comprehensive restorative justice mechanism in the study area.

Key words: Amare, indigenous, conflict resolution, peace building, Jama Woreda.

INTRODUCTION

In the field of conflict resolution and peace building, thorough understanding of the nature, dynamics and context of conflict occurrences should be the fundamental concern. Many contemporary violent conflicts across the world cannot be conceived merely as war but also characterized by a complex host of actors, issues and motives, which exists in extended families, tribes, ethno-linguistic and religious groups. Incidentally, understanding

the nature of conflict is imperative to find out the most appropriate and feasible conflict resolution approaches (Mpangala, 2004). According to Zartman (2000), conflict can be prevented and managed in certain occasions but resolved only if parties pursue a compromise and non-zero-sum game results. Therefore, as Bukari (2013) argued, the biggest challenge facing human beings nowadays is not only about the occurrence of conflict

E-mail: tesfayekefelegn@gmail.com. Tel: 251918104355 or 0953363954.

Author(s) agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

per se but also the usage of desired resolution mechanisms. Conflict is an inevitable phenomenon ubiquitous in human society raised from incompatibility and differences of interests, goals and values for resources, ideas, perception, beliefs, power and status (Swanstrom, 2005; Wanende, 2013).

Indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms refers to the local approach that communities use in resolving localized disputes through historically accumulated and locally defined knowledge, culture, and practices (Murithi, 2006). Regarding to this, Ginty (2008) also argues indigenous mechanisms mean a locally agitated activities, usages, norms and practices used for conflict resolution and peace building. The term indigenous is become interchangeable with many distinctive dispute resolution mechanisms operating outside the scope of the formal justice system. These include customary, traditional, non-state, informal, popular, and alternative methods (Gebreyesus, 2014; Wajkowska, 2016).

It is true that several societies everywhere have had their own long lived indigenous and customary conflict resolution and transformation methods, which intensely entrenched in the cosmology and cultures' of the people; however it is hardly found in reality today (Zartman, 2000; Boege, 2006; Omeje, 2008). In Africa, the assimilation and imposition of exogenous approaches of conflict in the indigenous one led steady attrition of African traditional values (Bob-Manuel, 2010). Alongside, indigenous approaches to conflict resolution and peace process are endowed with valuable insight for the rebuilding of social trust and restoration of conditions for communal co-existence through more inclusive and community based process since they are inherent and draw from cultural knowledge bases of the society (Lederach, 1998; Murithi, 2008).

Apart from this, African indigenous knowledge systems, which practiced for long time through emphasizing on communality and interdependence are rooted in the social, cultural, historical and believe system of the communities (Endalew, 2014). As a result, Africa indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms (ICRMs) inclined on whole community as parties in a dispute through recognizing truth telling, healing, reparation and reconciliation as a major instruments in the lives of African society (Daniel, 2010; Murithi, 2006; Bukari, 2013; Mpangala, 2004; Olateju, 2013). Despite cultural differences and ritual ceremonies in Africa, indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms are holistic, consensus oriented and we-group approach to avoid vicious circle of conflict and they are complementary with the principles of restorative justice (Boege, 2006). On the contrary, Ayithey (2014) argues that the indigenous idiom, which relies on African solution for African problems through African indigenous mechanisms and institutions, has become dishonored. For him it does not mean an intervention of African dictators through corrupt legal system, rather Africans indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms that

are deeply rooted in the tradition, custom and values of African society to ensure future peaceful co-existence.

In Ethiopia, which is a museum of diversified ethnic groups, ICRMs have been practiced across different communities for centuries in restoring the broken relationships and ensuring future peaceful coexistence among the conflict parties (Gebreyesus, 2014). In communities of Amhara, its accessibility makes the *Shimglina* or Council of Elders' is widely accepted and practiced indigenous conflict resolution mechanism (Bamlak, 2013; Tihut, 2010). As counterpart, Jama *Woreda* community of South Wollo Zone in Amhara regional state has long lived ICRM called *Amare*. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore the role and process of *Amare* ICRM in restorative justice and transformative peace building in Jama *Woreda*.

METHODOLOGY

To effectively address the intended objectives and questions regarding the roles and processes of *Amare* indigenous knowledge system for conflict resolution, this paper has employed a qualitative research approach. Qualitative approach is preferable for social science research in which it helps to explore, investigate and understand events, theories and human behaviors (Creswell, 2003). To scrutinize useful knowledge in-depth from those who have knowledge about the issue and to acquire insight relationships as well as discover ideas, experience, and interactions and perspectives; exploratory design is advisable (Kothari, 2003). Therefore, taking into accounts the objectives, which needs deep exploration and investigation in its natural setting, this paper is designed to be exploratory. Collecting appropriate data is considerable in context though there are several ways of data collection tools (Kothari, 2003). Accordingly, the researcher conducted 17 in-depth interviewees (with elders, social leaders, religious leaders, Women, Youth), 15 participants in 3 separate focus group discussions with judges and polices, conciliators, and 4 key-informants (from *Woreda* conflict resolution and security office, culture and tourism office, Militia office and Zone security office). This was to collect the required primary data and make triangulation for data validity and trustworthiness. In addition, document analysis is also employed. To that end, the non-probability sampling technique has been employed in this paper to purposively access the required data from knowledgeable individuals about the issue at hand. Pertaining to this, as Phrasisombath (2009) stated that non-probability sampling technique is preferable in qualitative research to deliberately select the participants of the study.

THE CONTEXT: OVERVIEW OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CUSTOMARY PRACTICES

Conflict may be managed by the formal justice system but not resolved and transformed at all because resolution and transformation can be attained through a healing and forgiveness in reconciliation than mere short term managing practices (Zartman, 2000). Customary practices and indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa are inherited in the culture, norms and customs of the societies (Murithi, 2006). The primordial orientations of indigenous mechanisms and institutions are attached to the disposition and psychology of the specific society. Furthermore, they allowed the parties in conflict to understand that norms and customs have capacities to induce social harmony.

Apart from this, Jama *Woreda* community has been practicing indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and customary practices for long. In the community, the customary practices and indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms have religious, psychological and social orientation basements. The presence of such elements in the indigenous mechanisms and customary practices enabled the people to respect the conflict resolution process. The many customary practices and social institutions have aimed to promote and give a sermon to communal co-existence by condemning social evils. These customary practices include *idir* (social cooperation in time emergency), *mahiber* (religious association in Orthodox), *sedeka* (religious association in Islam), *debo* (social cooperation to do something together), and so forth. Moreover, there are widely accepted and recognized indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and practices, which have been involving directly in conflict resolution and peace building process in the study area. These include *Mesal*, *Siwur deba* (local dispute resolver), *Afrsata* (way of finding the truth by swear), and *Amare* (Council of Elders). However, the basic concern of this thesis is examining the place and status of indigenous *Amare* /council of elders/ mechanism; the researcher would like to understand the other customary practices, which have contributed in the field as follows.

Mesal

Mesal, sometimes called “*yeshekoch chilot*” in South Wollo (Meron, 2010), is a customary practice and mechanism to investigate the truth for an action done without evidence. Similarly, in Jama community *Mesal* has been applying at *Sheiky* house (before *Sheiky* *chilot*). With this regard, *Sheiky* refers to the person who judges or gives *Mesal*. In this practice, the victim comes and presents the issue to the *Sheiky* to investigate the truth. *Mesal* has both material and psychological/spiritual/ dimensions. On the one hand, it is incense (locally called *Etan/Adruss*) which threatens the wrongdoer to admit his/her offence before the *Sheiky chilot*. On the other hand, it has great psychological fear of its consequence if the suspect or wrong doers do not present the truth before the *Sheiky*. The assumption is that if the wrongdoer fails to admit the truth before the *Sheiky*, something evil will happen to him or his families. Accordingly, if the wrongdoer does not admit his or her offence, the *Sheiky* allows the victim to cursing and mooring *Mesal* against him/her.

Afrsata/Awuchachign/

Afrsata is a community practice in which they meet together to identify the wrongdoers when offences committed at their village. In this case, every resident of the village (from youth to elders) met at a particular place where confessions are usually made. Consequently, if no one admits, all of them must swear. Finally, they curse and blame the unknown wrongdoer in the name of God/Allah via presenting at church or mosque. By doing so, *Afrsata* is used to avoid social ills and deter the acts of hidden crimes.

Kire/Idir/

Kire is the most prominent and powerful social institution in Jama community. Accordingly, it is people’s contract and customary convection to cooperate with each other in case emergencies. A wise and matured person selected by the residents called *Abahaga* heads this institution. *Kire* has regulations and enforcement powers to bind its members of the community. These range from simple warning to social sanctions or isolation. With this regard, during interview with *Abahaga*, it is reflected that if anyone who is

disobedient to that of customary *Kire* rules, he/she will be punished even up to social isolation. In addition, having a relationship with the one who is sanctioned by *Kire* is strictly forbidden. Here, if anyone has, he/she also impose punishment as an alliance with wrongdoers. In so doing, *Kire* has paramount contribution to maintaining social bond and harmony since it is acceptable and binding in the community. As a result, *Amare* Council of Elders used it in reconciliation process to enforce the conflict parties particularly in serious conflicts and homicide.

Nature and History of Amare Council of Elders Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanism

Like many societies and communities in Ethiopia and elsewhere, Jama *Woreda* community has its own culture of indigenous conflict resolution mechanism. *Amare* or Council of Elders who are respected and legitimate elders in the community runs this. For long time, in the absence of formally organized justice system people had been resolved from simple to complex conflicts and assured their peaceful relationships through this traditional mechanism. For many generations, village residents were selected representatives of the Council. The primary criteria of selecting these council representatives are age seniority and wisdom to function as *Amare* conciliators (*yehager shimagle, in Amharic*). The selected elders were met at a particular place called *Beto* river-shore under a shadow of a large tree. *Beto* is a big river where located between Jama and Borena *Woredas*. Accordingly, *Amare* Council of elders meets every year to discuss and revise their *Kuna* (arbitration rules and conventions) to reflect the social changes within the community. *Kuna* refers *Amare* Council of elders’ arbitration rules, which govern and mediate cases from simple conflicts to horrify homicides. Later on, the reconciliation place of *Amare* had shifted from *Beto*-river to *Kebele* or villages. This happened because of threats conciliators have faced from the increasing complexity and seriousness of cases, which needs legal protection since *Beto* located far from villages. Then onwards, *Amare* Council of Elders is newly organised at *Kebele* and *Woreda* levels. Accordingly, *Kebele* level committee comprises five elders, and seven *Amare* elders at *Woreda* level. The *Woreda* level *Amare* conciliators are responsible to assist those who work at *Kebele* to keep the verdict of justice in motion in case of serious and horrible homicide.

Social harmony, relationship and community values are the center of excellence for indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms (Fremont, n.d; Paffenholz, 2003). Likewise, *Amare* /Council of Elders/ reconciliation system comprised an indigenous knowledge of psychological healing and forgiveness besides material compensation. In addition, *Amare* is highly focused on preaching pacifism peace thinking that enable the community to develop a peaceful approaches to conflict resolution. This could be through their unreserved efforts of teaching and begging the community to appreciate that *blood is never returned by blood, leave hatred and revenge to God* and so forth (Elders in FGD3, 24/06/2017). *Amare* conflict resolution and peace building mechanism has its own ritual practices and different conciliation instruments depending on the severity of cases. Therefore, it has different modes of operations and usages to homicide and non-homicide offences.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Amare’s restorative justice approach to non-homicide conflicts

Conflicts and disputes in the study area have varying degrees of intensity ranging from simple family related

Table 1. *Amare* arbitration rules and conventions.

S/N	Level of Injured and Crime	Amount of Compensation and punishment in birr (ET.)	Remark
1	Bruise / <i>Senber/</i>	1,000	Then reconcile
2	Fracture / <i>Sbrat/</i>	2,000	Reconciliation
3	Red blood / <i>Key dem/</i>	1,500	"
4	Black blood / <i>Tkur dem/</i>	2,000	"
5	bone broke / <i>Attnt sibrat/</i>	3,500	"
6	One eye/	15,000	"
7	For one tooth	3,000	"
8	Rupture/ <i>wulkat/</i>	5,000	"
9	Half paralyzed / <i>gmash nafa/</i>	15,000	"
10	Full paralyzed / <i>mulu nafa/</i>	20,000	"
11	Murder	20,000	Blood feud reconciliation
12	Horrify murder	25,000	"
13	Theft	500-2000	Then pay decided amount
14	Burning other houses/ <i>bet makatell/</i>	1,500	"
15	Falsehood witness for homicide	10,000	Then reconciliation
16	Promiscuity with married people	5,000	Mostly the unmarried
17	Rape of damsel	5,000	The reconcile
18	Deliberate transferring of HIV/ADIS	10,000	"
19	Violation of erk/conciliation/	1big pot <i>tela</i> and 2 <i>defo</i> breads	Then reconcile
20	Marriage with in three family lineage/ <i>eske sost zimdna bet megabat/</i>	2 big pot <i>tela</i> and 2 <i>defo</i> breads	Then divorce
21	Going to Sorcerer/witchcraft.....	3 big pot <i>tela</i> and 3 <i>defo</i> bread	Warning not to go again

Source: *Woreda Security Administration and Conflict Resolution Office (2017)*.

disagreements to murder. However, the constitution asserts the role of indigenous mechanisms and customary practices to civil and family related issues, *Amare* Council of Elders has been engaging in criminal matters (Table 1). It has also clear set of compensation amounts and other implicit punishments for each injured and offences.

In addition to these punishments and compensations the perpetrators or wrongdoers should prepare ritual ceremonies like *tela* (*local drink*), and *Dabo, kolo* and *ingera* (*local food*) during the reconciliation for parties feed together and induce conciliation. Furthermore, with the degree of victimization, conciliators may also impose labor punishment against the wrongdoers in favor of the victim in the cases of fracture and rapture. Some of these include collecting the victim's crop (locally, *Azmera*), collect wood, and buying sheep, and so on. By doing so, sometimes such punishments and practice are subject to critics from economic and human right perspectives.

From economical point of view, preparation of over dozen *dabo, kolo* and *tela* are extravagant. Furthermore, forcing the offender to give labor service to victim in addition to the expected compensation imposed by *Amare* is also against human rights.

***Amare's* mode of transformative maneuver in blood feud reconciliation**

Homicide has been imposing massive devastating impacts such as displacement of households in *Jama Woreda*. This is due to culture of revenge in the community. In so far as, it needs the intervention of the culture based indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms alongside the formal justice system. Historically, *Amare* has played pivotal role in restoration of relationships and transformation of hatred in post-homicide. With this regard, in case perpetrators are under the control of the law in jail, conciliators have played their moral and social responsibility of bargaining between victim and offender's families to discard culture of revenge (locally, *dem melash*). This has been doing through blood feud reconciliation (locally called *yedem erk*) with different customary practices and ritual cleansing ceremonies. *Amare* conciliators have been doing blood feud reconciliation the perpetrator is either in jail or after his /her release from prison. Most of the time blood feud reconciliation taking place after the release of perpetrators from prison. However, until his/her release vengeance between victim and offender's families could be prevented through *Arami* (temporary way of reconciliation to prevent revenge).

Once homicide happens, the perpetrator or his families must request reconciliation with victim's families through *Amare* after three months of murder act. The reason for waiting three months is the sign of respect to victim's families. Accordingly, perpetrator or his family should select three close relative elders from perpetrator's father and mother pedigree to request conciliators for reconciliation. Consequently, culturally respected and praised *Amare* conciliators supplicate victim's family by pacifying that *blood should not be paid by blood rather it is better to heal and forgive in the name of God and leave vengeance to God*. Until victim's families consent for reconciliation, *Amare conciliators*, security persons and religious leaders stay at the victim's village. After conciliators have consents from victim's families, blood feud reconciliation process begins with culture based practices and ritual cleansing ceremonies. To that end, there are specific customary rules and ritual practices that have been taking in blood feud reconciliation process for the purpose of compensating victim's families and avoiding the culture of lineage vengeance as well. These are *Bele* (swearing), *Arami* (temporary reconciliation until Guma is paid), and Guma (blood or life price).

A/ Bele

According to participants' data, *Bele* has both material and psycho-spiritual dimensions. On the one hand, it is sharp pointed metal called spear (locally, *Ankase*) and sometimes represented by rifle. On the other hand, it is an oath and swearing taking place at the end of conciliation process to avoid revenge. During reconciliation, *Bele* (spear or rifle) is seated before the conflict parties and they cross it by swearing *if I do not keep my word, Jama Bele will betray me; and if I violate Bele my gun misfire*. In so doing, there is a belief in the wider community that once the conflict parties swear/oath/ on *bele* they can never kill each other and if they attempt, their guns become fail.

B/ Arami

Arami is one of the ways that has been practicing by *Amare* conciliators to promote social peace when homicide happens. It is a customary practice through which ceremonies held for victim's and killer's families to eat together to prevent revenge against perpetrator's families. Regarding to this, there is a payment by murderer's families and relatives to victim's families by denying the perpetrator until *Guma* is paid for living in tolerance. To that end, the murderer's families ask consent of victim's families through *Amare* elders for *Arami*. A payment for *Arami* is varying depending on murderer's kinship affiliation. Hence, according to *Amare* arbitration rules each families of the murderer are

expected to pay money for *Arami* independently (father and mother 500 birr, sisters and brothers 100 birr, children and wife 300 birr). The rest of his/her relatives are expected to pay 50 birr. More to this, Muradu and Gebreyesus (2009) stated that in societies of communal life philosophy, murder by individual could be a collective matter. Here, that is why killer's families and relatives are being responsible to revenge on the one hand, and pay *Arami* on the other hand in the study area. After *Arami* is paid, victim's families swear on *Bele* not to revenge perpetrator's families. But if one of victim's families is not voluntary for *Bele*, he/she will be punished 1,000 birr and enforce to swear. In addition, if any one of victim's families is not voluntary to get *Bele* after *Arami* is paid, he/she is prohibited or isolated from community based social institutions through social sanction.

C/ Guma

Guma is a blood price that has been practicing exclusively in blood feud reconciliation to reconstruct the post-homicide community. In this regard, Meron (2010) argued that *Guma* in Oromo community of South Wollo Zone is a way of killing revenge and receiving blood price. In addition, Tamene (2013) also says it is indispensable psychosocial conflict resolution mechanism and a model of restorative justice as a supplement for the state justice system in the Oromo societies. *Guma* as a life insurance payment by offender or his family (father, mother, brother, sister, child and wife) to the victim's families so as to avoid lineage retaliation currently reaches 20,000-25,000 Ethiopian Birr in the study community.

According to the elders and religious leaders, during the blood feud reconciliation process conflict parties are seat left and right sides. Then after, conciliators hear the stories of both parties in-depth decide the act is either horrified murder or coincidence. Furthermore, the place where murderer and his families will live after *Guma* is arranged. Accordingly, murderer's families (father, mother, sisters, brothers, wife and children) should leave to neighboring village (*idir*) temporarily to reduce the tension with victim's families. If the market place, plowing land, road and the likes are common areas for the parties, should be clearly demarcated, and prohibited for the perpetrator. It means the killer never attends at the market where common with his enemies instead allowed to go somewhere else.

There is strong and backward thinking of revenge that "*blood never gets old; blood return by blood*". To that end, after *Guma* is paid victim's families come to swear in *bele*. If any one of the victim's families violates the *Bele* and commits vengeance murder, he/she must pay 50,000 birr and make blood conciliation again. Therefore, conciliators beg the victim's family to forgive and heal him sincerely in the name of God/Allah. Then after, there are ritual practices and ceremonies to enable conflict parties

eat together. To that end, ram goat is slaughtered by *Sheiky* in the name of *Bele*. If the conflicting parties are from different religions and the slaughter billy goat is one, it must belong to Muslims since the *Bele* is come from *Sheik's* house. Finally, curtain has blank out between victim's families and murderer, and they exchange give *ingera* (local food) each other under blank out curtain and the reconciliation process concluded.

Challenges of Amare council of elders in transformative peace building

Although ICRMs in Ethiopia have been doing a lot in restitution of victims and reintegration of offenders to praising social harmony in line with the principle of restorative justice, they faced repression and neglect from the formal legal system (Endalew, 2014). Regarding to this, as elders revealed that the interaction between indigenous institutions and state justice system in the field could determine the visibility of conciliators. *Amare* conciliators are said to be "*Wing of the People*" since the community elects them who are respected and have culturally accumulated knowledge. Since elders are familiar with community's problems, they can provide social justice and harmony. Indeed, council of elders does not focus only direct perpetrators and victims but also all vulnerable groups to maintain social harmony and solidarity. Regarding to this, Meron (2010) stated that in Oromo communities of South Wollo Zone the community would prefer indigenous mechanism to the formal legal system. However, there are factors, which have been hindering the roles of *Amare* indigenous mechanism in sustainable peace through restorative justice principles and applying indigenous knowledge system. These challenges are classified as community-based, negligence by and inconsistencies with state formal justice system, and conciliators related.

A/ Community-related factors

It is reflected that since the legitimacy and power of customary leaders and *Amare* Council of Elders originate from the free-will and consent of community, they are acceptable and respected. However, there are social factors emerging from the community and their culture that challenge effective realization of reconciliation. In fact, *Amare* reconciliation has aspirations and capacities to restore peaceful relationships but problems have been originating from backward attitude of the community.

Accordingly, absence of victim's or his/her families consent for conciliation is the major problem for *Amare's* dis-functionality and discontinuity. This arises from vanity of honor in which if the victim or his families immediately accept conciliation the community considered it as humiliation. One of the elders during discussion clarified

the issues as follows:

"There is long lived culture of revenge in our community. If somebody is hurt and bleed, he/she will not reconcile easily unless return similar action. If not, that is considered as a coward and shame in the community. There are many traditional sayings that motivate revenges and killing. Some of these include the man who cannot return his or his family's blood is coward; blood return by blood /without balanced reaction, reconciliation never sustain. These traditional thinking encourage the victim for revenge and in turn affect reconciliation and peace building process" (Focus Group Discussion, 18/02/2017).

The other community based factor that has been challenging *Amare shimglina* practice is the repeated violation of *Bele /oath/* in the aftermath of conciliation. *Bele* is recognized conciliator's instruments in reconciliation and has paramount advantage to reduce the culture of revenge killings. Sometimes parties pretend as seriously reconcile and swear in *Bele* before *Shimagles* but they betray and revenge soon.

B/ Negligence by and inconsistencies with formal state justice system: Simplified dichotomy of peace and justice

As justice professionals confirmed that, there are plenty of tasks expected from government and formal justice system to encourage institutions and mechanisms, which contribute for crime prevention and peace building. Besides, this can be done in accordance with their constitutional recognition and acceptance. Sometimes the effectiveness of ICRMs in peace building and conflict resolution is determined and affected by the interest and position of the legal justice system. Accordingly, state legal justice system has posed challenges against the indigenous *Amare* mechanism either deliberately or negligently.

The first challenge arising from formal justice actors is lack of attention in giving capacity building trainings to elders. With this, regard elders suggested that the state legal justice system considered itself as the sole peace-building actors in the complex community's social affairs. It means that legal justice actors left aside the indigenous mechanism as too traditional and backward than attempting to empower and make its partner in the peace building area. There is no any capacity building programs and trainings provided to conciliators from the government rather only blaming their unskilled activities. To this end, the absence of consistent and sufficient awareness creation and other related trainings to the community based peace building actors leads conciliators to engaging beyond their scope and mediating all issues exclusively which in turn creates tension with formal

justice system.

Absence of favorable work place for Amare shimagles or conciliators is also a challenge that distresses the effective realization of reconciliation. *Amare* committees reflected that conciliators have no a particular and conducive work place or office to perform their regular tasks. In this regard, amazingly the researcher discussed the *Woreda* level *Amare* conciliators *under the back of the wall* where given to them for working place. This shows the government is giving low attention and left the issue aside negligently but in turn, it implied depluming of the right to use rights (promising facilities) and caused conciliators to lose confidence on themselves and their task. There are also deliberate and conscious intervention of the state justice system in the activities and practices of local *Amare shimglina*. Accordingly, the lack of legal inclusion to conciliators' certain reconciliation instrument and decisions create dissatisfaction from the side of *Shimagles* so far. With this line, *Bele* and *Kire* is the basement of *Shimagles* to enforcing conflict parties and sustaining the reconciliation and peace agreements in more serious conflicts though currently lost their functions. Consequently, elders blame government or legal justice actors as knowingly planning and running against to such cultural values and institutions as backward and illegal. As a result, community based *Shimagles* become disappointed and uninterested to do their functions. On the contrary, legal professionals' data confirmed inevitably, the legal system intervene and has not been giving legal support to some of the mechanisms used by elders in the reconciliation process. The reason behind is the nature of such mechanisms run against the formal rule of law since they are consent based not binding in law. By doing so, indigenous actors become incapacitated and consider the intervention as against their power to diminish the peace building effort.

Finally, the politicization of *Shimagles* (conciliators) for political agenda prior to every day social peace activities also posed challenges to the continuity of *Amare's* conflict resolution role. In light of this, the trend of unjustifiable interference in favor of official's interest is common. In addition, certain officials arbitrarily intervene and attempt to enforce conciliators to change their decisions than giving consistent support.

C/Conciliators related factors

However, local based customary mechanisms and practices have significant contribution in conflict resolution and sustainable peace building; sometimes they are not congruent to changing circumstance of the modern world. As data of key informants confirmed occasionally *Shimagles* faced negligence by the state legal justice system and the community as well but these are not the only and underlying factors to downsize the role played by *Amare*. Rather the lots of personal problems and shortcomings seeming to *Amare shimagles*

or conciliators also in turn diminish visibility of the institution.

In the first place, lack of commitment resulting from absence of payment to *Shimagles* is a critical challenge. In fact, commercialization of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms is a topical problem and runs against its voluntary nature (Baker, 2013). Elders who are working on conflict resolution are not paid, and give free services so far. With this regard, one of *Amare Shimagle* remembered "the situation that many years ago when the amount of *Guma* was 100 *tegera* Birr they [elders] had 20 of it. But currently, nothing is paid for their reconciliation role rather doing voluntarily for community peace" (Focus Group Discussion with Elders, 18/02/2017). Consequently, this in turn affects their personal life/household since they spent their work time in reconciliation.

Furthermore, *Shimagles'* fear of producing animosity incapacitated the well-functioning of this customary institution practices. Most of the time community considered the role of conciliators as mandatory not as voluntary service. During *shimglina* conciliators rarely used enforcement mechanisms to the aspiration of perpetuating peace and harmony at parties particularly and in the community at large. However, conflict parties become dissatisfied by decision of elders if the result is disenchanted. As a result, parties produce hatred to elders. In light of this, Galtung (1967) in his *transcend approach of theorizing conflict, violence and peace* suggested that conflict resolution could create new patterns and goes beyond parties' goal for future mutual existence. In other words, the goals of parties may not be always kept in reconciliation process but finds the common ground, and if not conciliators may go beyond what the parties want to seek for the aim of ensuring social harmony. Nevertheless, as participants of the research divulged, conciliators and mediators have threat of producing enmity to themselves and their families, which in turn restricts their tasks in the field of peace building.

CONCLUSION

Conflict continues to be a menace and debilitating for many states across the globe. Apart from this, the scourge of inter-personal conflicts and homicide afflicts the study area of *Jama Woreda*. As the finding of this study showed, conflict/homicide is a common phenomenon and alarmingly escalating with adverse devastating social and economic effects. These effects are the loss of social capitals and social disorder, household firing and family displacement, economic vulnerability, political mistrust, legacy of psychological trauma, threat and suspicion. The causes of the conflicts have account different sources which arouse in peoples' interaction and relations deliberately and negligently. Among these are land and inheritance issue, drunkenness

and inebriation, corrupt and biased trials in the legal system, illegal proliferation of small arms and the culture of revenge.

Jama *Woreda* community has many customary practices and ritual ceremonial activities sermonize social harmony. Their indigenous conflict resolution mechanism is called *Amare* /council of elders/ *shimglina*. The nature and practice of *Amare*/council of elders/ as indigenous conflict resolution and reconciliation in Jama community is based on looking at individuals in and from the community to promote social harmony. *Amare's* central theme of social harmony and its relationship orientations with the community's culture of communality fortifies that of reconciliation, forgiveness and healing to be its center of conflict resolution and peace building process. *Amare shimglina* mechanism has a social and religious basements and responsibilities to mediate and reconcile from simple to blood feud reconciliation. There are customary practices and ritual ceremonies used as instruments in the compensation, mediation and reconciliation process of *Amare*. These include *Bele*, *Arami*, *Guma*, and other ritual cleansing ceremonies taking at the end of the mediation and reconciliation. These practice have psychological, economic and trauma healing dimensions.

However, the finding of the paper asserts that there are many encountered problems, which undermine the visibility and operationalization of *Amare shimglina* indigenous mechanisms. These are sourced from the community, negligent and deliberate activities of the formal justice actors and the elders/conciliators/. Thus, the inactive role of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and the mere intervention of formal justice in the field are unable to halt the culture of revenge and ensure social harmony.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Ayittey J (2014). African Solution for African Problem: The Real Meaning <https://kasioeconomics.com/.../african-solutions-for-african-problems-the-real-meaning>.
- Baker B (2013). Where the Formal and Informal Justices Meet: Ethiopians pluralism. *African Journal of International Comparative Law* 21(2):202-218.
- Bamlak Y (2013). Assessment of indigenous conflict resolution systems and practices: implications for socio-economic development. A survey of Simada Woreda, Amhara region, Ethiopia.
- Bob-Manuel I (2000). A cultural approach to conflict transformation: An African traditional experience. Term Paper. Written for the course: "Culture of Peace and Education" taught at the European Peace University Stadtschlaining Austria. Fall Semester 2000. https://www.academia.edu/31575464/PEACE_TRADITIONS_AND_CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_TRADITIONAL_APPROACH
- Boege V (2006). Traditional approaches to conflict transformation – potentials and limits. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Managements https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/boege_handbook.pdf
- Bukari KN (2013). Exploring Indigenous Approaches to Conflict Resolution: The Case of Bawku Conflict in Ghana. *Journal of Sociological Research; Macro thinking institute*. Volume 4, ISSN 1948-5468.
- Creswell J (2003). *Qualitative, quantitative and mixed research methodology*. 2nd Ed.
- Daniel M (2010). Indigenous legal traditions as a supplement to African traditional justice initiatives. *African Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10(3).
- Endalew L (2014). Ethiopian Customary Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Forms of Restorative Justice. *African Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14(1):125-154.
- Fremont J (n.d). Legal pluralism, customary law and human rights in the Francophone African Countries. <https://www.victoria.ac.nz/law/research/publications/about-nzacl/publications/special-issues/hors-serie-volume-viii,-2008/Fremont.pdf>
- Gebreyesus T (2014). Popular Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Ethiopia: Trends, Opportunities and Challenges. *African Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14:1.
- Ginty RM (2008). Traditional and Indigenous Approaches to Peacemaking. In: Darby J., Ginty R.M. (eds) *Contemporary Peacemaking*. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Kothari CR (2003). *Research methodology, methods and techniques*. 2nd Ed., New Age International Publisher.
- Lederach JP (1998). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, D.C: United States institute of peace press.
- Meron Z (2010). Shakoch Chilot (the Court of the Sheikhs): A traditional institution of conflict resolution in Oromiya Zone of Amhara Regional State, Ethiopia. *African Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10(1).
- Mpangala GP (2004). Conflict resolution and peace building in Africa as a process: Case Studies of Burundi and the DRC. University of Dares Salaam, the MWALIMU NYERERE foundation.
- Murithi T (2006). African approach to building peace and social solidarity. A senior researcher at the Center of Conflict Resolution, South Africa: University of Cape Town.
- Murithi T (2008). African Indigenous and exogenous approaches to peace and conflict resolution: In David JF (Ed). *Peace and conflict in Africa*. London: Zed book.
- Olateju AR (2013). Preserving the traditional measures of conflict in Africa. University of Ibanda, Nigeria: *Journal of Education Research and Behavioral Science* 2(12):232-238.
- Omeje KC (2008). Understanding conflict resolution in Africa. In David JF (ed.). *Peace and conflict in Africa*. London: Zed Book.
- Paffenholz T (2006). *Community Based Bottom-up Peace Building: The Development of the Life and Peace Institute Approach to Peace Building and lessons Learned from the Somalia Experience (1990-2000)*, Sweden: life and peace institute.
- Phrasisombat K (2009). Sampling size and sampling methods. Faculty of Post-graduate studies and research University of health science practices; USA: University of South Florida.
- Swanstrom NW (2005). Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and beyond: a conceptual exploration. CACI & SRSP, Washington and Uppsala.
- Tamene K (2013). Exploring Guma as an indispensable psycho-social method of conflict resolution and justice administration. *African Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13(1).
- Tihut A (2010). Gender Relations in Local-Level Dispute Settlement in Ethiopia's Zegie Peninsula. *Human Ecology Review* pp. 160-174.
- Wanende EO (2013). Assessing the role of traditional justice systems in resolution of environmental conflicts in Kenya. Centre for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and Policy (CASELP).
- Wajkowska E (2016). Doing justice: How informal justice systems can contribute. UNDP, the democratic governance fellowship program; Oslo Governance Center.
- Zartman IW (2000). *Traditional curse for modern conflicts: African traditional conflict "medicine"*. (ed.), Boulder London: Lynne Rinner Publisher Incorporation.

Commentary

Remembering summerdale: A scandal that reformed policing

Greg Hoffman* and Anne D. Kroemer

7700 W. Farragut Ave, Chicago, Illinois 60656, United States.

Received 22 June, 2020; Accepted 3 July, 2020

PROLOGUE

The following article contains never-before-published accounts from first-hand witnesses to the events surrounding the Summerdale Scandal, garnered by one of the authors in personal interviews with key stakeholders. These include interviews with former Evanston and Bartlett Police Chief William McHugh, former Illinois Police Superintendent James McGuire, former Cook County State's Attorney Chief Investigator Paul Newey and renowned attorneys Gerald Getty, Julius Echels and Louis Galippo. Though all have now passed away, their words bring to life an event that forever changed policing in America.

In 1960, a massive scandal rocked the Chicago Police Department. Rife with clandestine schemes, audacious exploits and a level of corruption that stunned the public, the Summerdale Scandal nearly brought down the entire Chicago police organization. Once the scandal unfurled, it would transform policing, not just in Chicago, but around the country. 2020 will mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Summerdale Scandal, and once again find ourselves recovering from police corruption. The scandal surrounding the events of the 2017 Chicago Police shooting of Laquan McDonald resulted in the firing of a police superintendent, affected the decision of Mayor Rahm Emmanuel in not running for re-election, and forced the Chicago Police Department into a Federal Oversight Consent Decree. Now, as we approach the 60th anniversary of the Summerdale Scandal, it bears revisiting this transformative event that dramatically overhauled policing four decades earlier.

By 1960, policing in America had become anachronistic. Graft, corruption, political patronage and extortion were almost routine, actually widely accepted as common practice by the 'men in blue'. Even when officers did not participate directly in corruption, they looked the other way. Yet at the same time, our country was experiencing a renaissance of civil rights and freedoms, and the public wanted a professional, trustworthy police department. Summerdale was the spark that ignited public outrage and galvanized demand for systemic change.

THE BEGINNING

In the summer of 1958, 23-year old Richard Morrison, a career burglar, began delivering pizza in Chicago's 40th district, the Summerdale district. His arrest record dated back to 1953 and included burglary, prowling and petty larceny across several states. The pizza delivery job represented his stated, albeit dubious, desire to 'go straight'; he held a second legitimate job and planned to marry. But his fate changed when he ran into a former Senn High School classmate and Chicago Police Officer Frank Faraci as Faraci exited a local liquor store. Faraci greeted "little burglar Richie" and, when Morrison asked him how he was doing, said he had been doing "better if you would cut us guys in on some of your

*Corresponding author. E-mail: hoffmangregory@att.net.

jobs...you know Al Karras (another Chicago Police Officer) and some of the other fellows, and we will go along with the show. After all, we like nice things, too." It did not take much more than this one little conversation to turn Morrison from going "straight" and heading right back into the life of crime.

The seeds of what was to become a full-fledged corruption ring of crooked cops were planted after a simple attempt to steal some golf clubs from a car parked on an Evanston, Illinois street went awry.

On the night of July 31, 1958, Morrison went drinking with two of the Summerdale cops: Al Karras and Allen Brinn. Morrison recounted, "Al and Brinn had been asking when I was going to steal some golf clubs for them. I was getting sick and tired of them asking for them. By 11:30 that night, I was pretty loaded, so I got in my car and drove up into Rogers Park, remembered that about 20% of the newer cars had golf clubs in them so I started looking for a new one. I did not find any, so I drove up into Evanston." Unfortunately for Morrison, on the night he ventured up into Evanston, the police had set up a trap and were waiting for his arrival.

William McHugh, former Evanston and Bartlett police chief, was working as an Evanston detective on August 1, 1958, and distinctly recalls the night "Little Richie" made his way into his town. McHugh said, "I remember we were being hit hard by a series of car burglaries on Sheridan Avenue near the Chicago-Evanston border." On the night of August 1, McHugh had received a tip from an informant that Morrison was looking to steal some golf clubs. Armed with this information, McHugh and his partner, Jim Walsh, who would later become Chief of the Cook County Sheriff's Police, set up a trap to nab, as he was later dubbed by the papers, the "Babbling Burglar".

McHugh explained how he and his partners set up the trap: "What we did was polish up a set of golf clubs, put them in the back window of a station wagon, and parked it on Sheridan Avenue." They then waited for Morrison to take the bait. Sure enough, shortly thereafter, McHugh and his partners observed a light blue Cadillac turn slowly around the corner with its lights off and stop next to the car brandishing the golf clubs. Morrison exited his vehicle and "forced open a right-front ventilator window and attempted to remove" the golf clubs. According to McHugh, "that is when all hell broke loose. After Morrison tried to break into the car, he saw that it was a trap, and tried to get out of there. Shots were fired. In fact, one of our guys had an old 'Tommy' submachine gun and started to spray everything on the street, but that little guy got out of there. It was incredible, and I have to give Morrison credit, he could drive like no one I had ever seen before. I mean, he just jumped into his car, laid his head down on the seat, and floored the car out of there at full speed without even looking. The last thing we saw was the smoke from his tires and the rear taillights on his car." This was quite a stunt for a man who described himself as drunk that night. [Note: at this time, it was lawful police to shoot at fleeing felons.]

Morrison evaded McHugh that night, but the police quickly located his car, punctured by a few bullet holes, close to the scene of the crime. Following an investigation, McHugh was able to track down Morrison and eventually arrest him on charges of attempted burglary. After arresting Morrison, McHugh recalls, "He was a cocky little bastard, a good little thief but cocky. He was always describing himself as the 'Master Burglar', and I will give him credit, he was a smart little thief, but boy was he a braggart. I could not understand how those guys [the Summerdale defendants] could fall for his crap. He was a thief. It was so transparent." In fact, Morrison bragged to McHugh about his friends in the 40th district and McHugh warned the police in Summerdale to watch out for Morrison because "he was making a lot of wild accusations about the police." Some Summerdale police officers clearly did not heed those words.

The Summerdale gang was a motley crew, consisting of Morrison and eight police officers – Frank Faraci, Al Karras and his twin brother Sol Karras, Peter Beeftink, Henry Mulea, Allan Brinn, Patrick Groark Jr. and Alan Clements. Morrison also had two accomplices who often joined in, Frank Wilde and Robert Crilly. This was the core crew, although other police officers were also rumored to be involved.

LET THE CRIMES BEGIN

The first burglary took place on October 1, 1958; with winter rapidly approaching, the crooked cops wanted auto supplies for their vehicles, so they selected the Western Tire and Auto store for their first hit. Sol Karras had spotted a Browning automatic rifle in the store, and he wanted it, which gave that first burglary even more urgency.

When Morrison and accomplice Crilly arrived at the store, a parked vehicle was blocking the rear driveway, which they wanted to use as their entry point. They complained to Frank Faraci about it, who told them he had taken care of it: "I guess we will just have to push it out of the way." Faraci drove up to the store in his squad car with Al Karras and got behind the wheel of the parked car while Karras pushed it out of the way with his police vehicle. With the path now cleared, and armed with a shopping list of what the cops wanted, the burglars broke in and began their job.

Morrison felt well-protected during this first hit because he "had the place pretty well protected." Indeed, he had "three or four other squad cars covering the place," with one of the protecting vehicles driven by Summerdale patrolman Allen Brinn. Morrison testified that Brinn rode up to him twice in his squad car, urging him to "hurry because ... the fellows want to get in and get stuff too." After Morrison successfully hauled away three carloads of loot to a rented garage, the

police took their turn. Morrison stated: "Al Brinn, Alex Karras and Frank Faraci were carrying out boxes All of them were in uniform." The quartet planned to meet later that morning at Wesley's Snack Shop to discuss how to split up the proceeds, but then decided to postpone the meeting until later that evening; they were all too tired from loading up their squad cars with burglary loot.

Later that evening, the group met up at Sol Karras's home. After Morrison gave Sol Karras the Browning rifle, he recounted, "he said thanks for giving it to him before his brother arrived because if his brother had seen it first, he would have wanted it." After Faraci, Al Karras, Brinn and Patric Groark Jr. arrived, arguments erupted over who would get what spoils. Morrison restored peace by telling the crew "we could always open another store [and you] all could have television sets and radios." The Summerdale crew was officially in business, and for the next nine months, would be hard at work, stealing from those whom they had sworn to protect.

Faraci selected the crew's next target, the Sinclair Gas Station at 5452 N. Clark, because a pane of glass was missing from its sliding door, making entry relatively easy. During this burglary, Al Karras and Peter Beeftink carried stolen loot from the station to their squad cars. They hit the Self Furniture Store at 6322 N. Broadway the next day, stealing furniture and drapery their wives wanted. The Summerdale operation was humming along until October 16, 1958, when their hit of Stetler's Music Store at 5355 N. Clark Street nearly went awry. Morrison testified that he had just broken into the store and pocketed \$150.00 "when car 207 pulled up at a 45-degree angle with the red light on and the spotlight flashing. I saw Frank Faraci behind the wheel. I ran out the back door." Apparently Faraci heard the call of a "burglary in progress" over the radio while he was at the 40th district station. According to Morrison, "He happened to hear this call and he happened to know it was me in the place." In his confession, Morrison explained how Faraci rescued him that day, "He shot down there in [squad car] 207 and blocked the street, and he hit the window of the place." Morrison continues, "Frank Faraci blocked the street from the [detective] bureau car" which enabled him to flee and successfully escape. Faraci caught up with Morrison later that day and told him, "Boy, did you have a close call," adding that he drove over "80 miles an hour down Balmoral Avenue" in order to get him out of there. In appreciation for rescuing him, Morrison gave Faraci the \$150.00 he had pocketed during the burglary.

A few nights later, Morrison was riding in a squad car with Faraci and Al Karras when they were passed in the opposite direction by a squad car driven by Officers Peter Mulea and Henry Beeftink. Faraci, Karras, and Morrison were planning a burglary, and because of their greed, they did not want any other policemen involved. When Mulea and Beeftink made a U-turn, Faraci ordered Morrison to lay down and hide in the back seat of the car, after which a bizarre chase between the two police cars began. Morrison recounted, "We drove up and down alleys and finally wound up driving the wrong way on a one-way street. I jumped out when Faraci slowed down and rolled under a parked car. Just then, the other car with Hank Mulea pulled up behind." Morrison continued, "Mulea got out and walked over to Faraci and asked Frank, 'What's going on? We playing games tonight?'" An argument then broke out when Mulea exclaimed he saw "little Richie" in the back of Faraci's car. Faraci responded by saying Mulea "was seeing things" and the argument finally ended with Mulea saying, "Well, if there's anything going on tonight, we would like to get in on it."

Tensions and rifts were forming within the Summerdale crew around this time, with different members becoming suspicious of each other, and Morrison decided to take a break. Visiting Las Vegas, California, Missouri, Texas and several other states, he continued his criminal activities, spending counterfeit \$100 bills everywhere he went. Upon his return to Chicago, he was ready to resume burglaries with the Summerdale crew, only to discover that the Summerdale burglars had been committing hits without him. The cops were growing rapacious in their greed and careless. At one point, they offered Morrison a police uniform to wear on 'jobs', but Morrison did not want to go through the trouble of changing clothes. He later explained: "All these guys were doing anything for a dollar. They were greedy. They went for anything from automobiles parked in the streets to gumball machines." Of course, Morrison was equally acquisitive, but he was a burglar and proud of his profession, while the cops were truly a disgrace to their own.

In his first job following his return to Chicago, Morrison teamed up with a new Summerdale cop, Alan Clements. In February 1959, Clements suggested they burglarize Danny's Squirrel Lounge at 6600 N. Sheridan, a bar Clements had previously owned. According to Morrison, "Al Clements said to me that he would like to get in on doing some burglaries with me, but that he did not want to do them with any of the other fellows in the district. He said he would like to do them on his day off if possible." During the burglary of the Squirrel Lounge, which took place on March 3, 1959, Morrison was aided by his accomplice, Floyd Wilde. Morrison nabbed 10-20 cases of whisky for Clements -- who acted as a lookout for the two -- and gave him \$20 of the cash he had taken from the jukebox.

By the spring of 1959, the Summerdale crew's burglaries had grown increasingly audacious and reckless. During a shoe store burglary on Devon Avenue, the cops stole \$14,000 worth of shoes. Morrison remarked: "One of the policemen [Patrick Groark Jr.] was drunk ... and went to a tavern to try and sell them. He was selling them for \$2 a pair." After they left the tavern, "He almost piled up his car that night. We had to stop for the stoplight ... and he went right through the red light and almost piled up in the drug store. He [drove] up on the sidewalk and down the street. He was real drunk. Everyone around the tavern was talking about him selling the shoes. He was a real nut ... He wanted to do anything for money."

As the team became more and more irresponsible, infighting between members intensified. In March 1959, the group demanded that Morrison break into the Anderson Marine Store at 5800 N. Broadway; with spring and warmer weather around the corner, Al Karras desperately wanted an outboard motor so he could cruise around Lake Michigan with his boat. "Listen, Dick," he scolded Morrison, "you have been stalling on Marine Supplies and spring is here now, and tonight you are going to open that place up for us." Morrison later testified that he agreed to break the store's windows but refused to actually enter the store to burglarize it, fearing it was too risky with all the many late-night taverns in the area. In spite of Morrison's misgivings, he and his accomplice, Wilde, hatched a simple plan: throw bricks through the window and wait for crooked cops Al Karras and Patrick Groark, Jr., to arrive; the latter would then fire a couple of shots in the air, as if they were chasing the burglars, and then they would loot the store for themselves.

The plan worked well, but Morrison wanted to prove his point and give the reckless cops a scare. "We decided to walk down the alley like pedestrians," he recounts. "All of the sudden we see them both stop...with outboard motors in their arms. They said, 'Don't move, somebody's watching us.' So I busted out laughing, and I said 'you crazy jerks, it is only us.'" Karras and Groark did not find the prank amusing.

THE UNDOING OF THE SUMMERDALE CREW

The end of the relationship between Morrison and the Summerdale cops was drawing near. Morrison was convinced that some of the crooked cops had tried to kill him in order to guarantee his silence when he 'got shot up on Lawrence Avenue' while committing an insurance burglary. Suffering a gunshot to the wrist, he was later treated under an alias by a known mob doctor. Then, in April 1959, Morrison became convinced that the Summerdale cops laid a trap for him during a planned Sure Save Grocery store burglary in the 1000 block of Bryn Mawr. The plan was for Morrison to break in by entering through the store's back door, but feeling suspicious, he asked Al Brinn to look the place over first. Sure enough, after Brinn reported that the place did not look right, "the lighting was different", he called off the heist. The next night, Morrison was stopped by a detective, who asked him why he did not hit the Sure Save. At that moment, his suspicions were confirmed. Had he burglarized the Sure Save, he would have been gunned down by detectives who were waiting for him.

Before the crooked Summerdale cops could kill Morrison, however, he was saved by an honest cop who arrested him on July 30, 1959. James McGuire, former Superintendent of the Illinois Police and Deputy Chief of the Cook County Police, remembers first hearing about Richard Morrison in 1958, from aforementioned Evanston Detective William McHugh. At the time, McGuire was a Chicago Police burglary detective and explains, "He [McHugh] told me to watch out for this kid because he was thought to be involved with a couple of burglaries on the north side." McGuire continues, "At the time I was busy with some other cases, so I put his [Morrison's] picture aside. But it was funny, because a short time later, I remember seeing this kid in a restaurant I was in. He was talking with a friend about his rap sheet -- that got me a little excited and I tried to squeeze over as close as possible to hear what they were saying -- when I saw Morrison pull out of his pocket a huge roll of money. It was then that I knew I should find out what this kid was up to." A short time after this encounter, McGuire and his partner, Pat Driscoll, saw Morrison driving around in a suspicious auto. After they stopped him, they discovered that Morrison was in possession of some burglary tools. During the stop, Morrison revealed his true character: "Here, we were two experienced police officers, and he, about nineteen years old, was treating us like we were nothing. He was cocky, talking to us like he didn't have time for us."

The detectives made sure they had plenty of time for Morrison. They took him to the 11th and State police station to investigate him for carrying burglary tools. At the station, Morrison wasted no time exhibiting his skill in evading trouble.

"At the time we took Morrison in," McGuire explains, "we were investigating a pattern of burglaries at a north side department store. This place was getting hit every weekend when the store was closed." McGuire and his partner had agreed to be locked inside the store over the weekends in hopes of catching the burglar when he broke in. Says McGuire, "I remember that it was hot in there because it was summertime, and the owners would turn off the air conditioning over the weekend. Funny thing though, the guys never hit the place when we were in there. Then we bring Morrison downtown, and he tells us he can give us information on who the guy was that was hitting the store." McGuire and his partner were taken aback by this comment -- no one was supposed to know they were conducting this surveillance. But as McGuire states, "This little guy knows the whole time we're sitting in there, sweating, and I knew then he must have been getting information from someone on the inside." McGuire agreed to use Morrison as an informant, releasing Morrison in exchange for information, but the little burglar ended up giving them false and useless information. By the time they realized he had misled them, he was again on the loose.

This incident was a telling example of Morrison's character: he was arrogant and overweening, but he was also shrewd and able to adeptly extricate himself from thorny situations. This strategy would later cause the Summerdale Scandal to unfurl, but it would not help Morrison escape the next time he ran into Driscoll and McGuire.

With Morrison back on the streets, McGuire was again searching for him. "We get this information that Morrison is

staying in this apartment," said McGuire, "but when we get there it is dark inside and nobody's answering the door. We know he is in there, because this was a good tip, so we go around back and find an open window. I lifted one of the guys up through the window and he unlocks the back door for the rest of us." When McGuire and his partners entered the apartment and turned on the lights, there was a surprise waiting for them: "We turn on the lights and see him [Morrison] standing there with a gun in his hand. But being faced against four police officers, I guess he thought better and threw the gun away." When the detectives brought Morrison in, he did not act like he did the last time McGuire had him downtown. Said McGuire, "He was scared and very cooperative. He copped out to a whole bunch of burglaries he was involved in. He was scared because he knew we had him."

Morrison was in disbelief; it looked like the criminal justice system had finally caught him. He tried to work out a deal for a short prison term but was denied; he reached out to friends but was turned down. Bribes, which had always worked in the past, could not help him. Nobody was stepping forward; he had been abandoned to take the fall. Crafty, arrogant, clever Morrison was stuck. But -- he would do anything he needed to do to avoid the penitentiary, and he still had one last card to play to gain his freedom. On October 10, 1959, Morrison agreed to meet Cook County Public Defender Gerald Getty, later famous for defending mass killer Richard Speck, and started talking -- and one of the most influential scandals in the history of policing was finally discovered.

CONSPIRACIES REVEALED

Gerald Getty, whose tenacity brought the police scandal out in the open, recalled his first meeting with Morrison: "I remember when I first met him, he was a cocky little guy, like a banty rooster. He only started to rat on those guys when he felt that they had abandoned him." Morrison related to Getty the incredible story of how the Summerdale cops had helped him orchestrate and execute scores of burglaries. Getty, of course, was suspicious; he had heard other stories from defendants who would say anything in order to avoid the penitentiary. "We made a check on whether or not this was just a line, or whether he was just dreaming this stuff up. He had given us the date, time, and location of each burglary and [what] each officer got -- golf clubs, drapery -- so it was easy to check out." Getty sent out his investigators to check Morrison's stories and interview several store owners. Each time, the investigators discovered that the information provided by Morrison was remarkably, startlingly accurate. "The information Morrison gave us," says Getty, "was the same as what the store owners were telling us. This was no coincidence."

Getty then gave Morrison a lie detector test, which he "mostly" passed, and informed State's Attorney, Benjamin Adamowski about the staggering results of his investigation. According to Getty, in return for his cooperation, Morrison "was going to go bye-bye -- [serving] no time -- and they would get him out of town and down to Florida." Getty's job was complete. He had prevented Morrison from going to the penitentiary, and now it was the job of the State's Attorney to nab the criminals who were hiding behind their badges and bring them to justice.

The man tasked by State's Attorney Adamowski to follow up on Morrison's allegations was Chief Investigator Paul Newey. Newey, who had worked with the Treasury Bureau, the Federal Narcotics Bureau and the Central Intelligence Agency before taking the job as Chief Investigator for the State's Attorney, had the training, background, and integrity to deftly supervise the operation; it would eventually lead to the arrest of eight Chicago Police officers and change the department forever.

"MISSION IMPOSSIBLE"

Newey vividly recalled the events leading to the capture of the eight Summerdale police officers. "When I first met Morrison and took his statement," said Newey, "I thought it was almost impossible for him to be able to recall all that he did." He continued, "In all my experience in law enforcement, I never met a man with such a memory: he knew places, men, squad car numbers, times, the loot taken -- everything!" Like Getty, Newey verified the accuracy of Morrison's statements and following his investigation, it became completely, alarmingly clear that uniformed members of the Chicago Police Department were in fact engaging in burglaries while on duty. Said Newey, "Morrison's information checked out perfectly. I could not believe it. All the way down the line, everything he had told us turned out to be true. After reporting this information to State's Attorney Adamowski, the two devised a plan on how they were going to take the corrupt cops into custody.

Only top members of the Chicago Police Department were informed of the planned arrest of the eight police officers. Even this was done reluctantly; the State Attorney's office wanted to surprise the officers and arrest them late at night before they had the opportunity to dispose of any evidence. If other members of the Chicago Police Department were involved, the officers would surely be tipped off. As it turned out, even limiting the information to the top brass did not prevent at least one of the officers from learning about the forthcoming raid.

Leveraging techniques he had picked up while working as an agent in the CIA, Newey devised a clandestine operation in which the officers would be taken into custody in their homes, shortly after they retired to bed. Eight teams of specially selected officers were given sealed orders that were not to be opened until a designated time. Once they had read the concealed information, these teams then struck the homes of each of the eight police officers simultaneously, alleviating any possibility that the suspects would be alerted. On January 15, 1960, the teams -- led by Chief Investigator Newey -- hit their targets, and by 4:00 a.m., when it was over, eight police officers were in the hands of the State's Attorney -- along with four truckloads of stolen goods. Newey exclaimed, "The plan was executed perfectly; even today I wonder how I was able to pull all the things together ... it was like "Mission Impossible."

After the arrests, Newey went to each of the corrupt officers' homes to recover an abundant amount of stolen property from all homes except one; Patrick Groark, Jr. managed to elude investigators. Groark was extremely well-connected in the police department and came from a long-standing police family, so it is likely that he was somehow tipped off and managed to dispose of incriminating evidence. Regardless, too was indicted.

Truckloads of loot were recovered in the other officers' homes. Faraci turned out to be the most reactive, yelling at Morrison, calling him names and cursing in English and Italian, decrying his disloyalty and betrayal, shouting "I brought you to my home! I fed you!"

All of the officers taken into custody were processed at the Union League Hall in order to avoid media attention, but the following morning the *Chicago Sun-Times* broke the story. The public outcry that followed was swift, vocal and compelling; it would have an everlasting effect on the Chicago Police Department and the City of Chicago as a whole. At a press conference the following morning, State's Attorney Benjamin Adamowski stated, "Instead of police protection, people in that North Side area were getting police participation in crimes. If I were police commissioner, I think I would be concerned that similar situations might exist in other police districts."

Newspapers reported that in the Summerdale district, burglaries were up 48% compared with an 11% increase city-wide. Heavy losses forced many store owners out of business, and many more store owners had their insurance premiums cancelled or heavily increased. One victim, the owner of the Western Tire & Auto Store, related, "These guys broke into this store four times and cleaned it out. Guns, television sets, appliances, everything that was not nailed down. Then I will be a [expletive] if one of them did not come around at Christmas time and ask for a handout." The crimes committed by these officers, and countless others who had not been caught, were no longer going to be accepted by the public. As a result, there was an immediate demand for change from all sectors and the previously omnipotent Mayor Daley eventually had to acquiesce and give in to that change.

THE TRIAL

On June 26, 1961, the trial for the eight Summerdale crooked cops began. Judge James Parsons presided -- one of the first African American judges on the Criminal Court bench and later the first African American judge to be appointed to the Federal bench. Parsons was widely viewed as an honest, competent jurist. The jury, comprised all females, would need thorough convincing to believe the words of a career burglar over the testimony of eight Chicago policemen. Patrick Groark Jr. dropped out of the jury trial at the last minute, requesting a bench trial instead.

Four special prosecutors were assigned to the Summerdale trial: Benjamin Sears, Louis Garippo, Charles Rush, and Daniel J. McCarthy. Julius L. Echeles defended Frank Faraci, Charles Bellows defended Alan Clements, George Cotsirilos defended Peter Beeftink and Henry Mulea, Martin Schwarzbach defended the Karras brothers and Stephen Levy defended Allan Brinn. Not surprisingly, the trial was a media sensation -- the courtroom was packed with reporters, and for the next two weeks the public devoured headlines highlighting the Summerdale conspiracy.

Louis Garippo, a former prosecutor and judge who would later preside over the John Wayne Gacy trial, recalls the Summerdale trial. He remarked, "During the 50's, there was widespread corruption in the police department. The trial only brought it out into the open. In that time, if you were a burglar, you would go out with \$50.00 in your pocket -- that was how much it would cost you to be let go if you happened to be caught." During the trial, Garippo was responsible for preparing Morrison to testify. About Morrison, he said, "He was an insolent guy, prone to embellish his stories, and always making himself out to be a master burglar." Citing one example of how Morrison liked to exaggerate his stories, Garippo stated, "About the golf club case in Evanston, just before the trial, there was a story about a jewel thief in Florida who dove through the window of his waiting automobile in order to escape the police. We knew he jumped through the window too, but the way he told it, we knew he had just picked it up through the papers. It made it sound more exciting." During the trial, Garippo says Morrison held up very well. Although he tended to exaggerate his own exploits, the accuracy and detail of his statements could not be undermined. Because of the abundance of evidence, Garippo and the rest of his team felt there was little chance that the defendants would be acquitted. The defense, however, had its own strategy and hoped that if the case were positioned well, the cops could be exonerated.

Julius Echeles, now retired in Florida, represented Frank Faraci and remembers the Summerdale events well. Echeles, a well-known attorney at the time, served nine months at the Terre Haute Federal Penitentiary in 1957 after

being convicted of selling jobs in a post office scandal. After being released, he was reinstated to the bar in 1959 – an unusually rapid reinstatement. Of Faraci, Echeles recalled, "He was sort of short, a little dumpy, devastated by the accusations." Echeles' defense strategy was to blame the Summerdale Scandal on those who supervised the defendants. He stated, "One of the things I tried to show the all-female jury was that the man on top, the boss, the Captain, [was] responsible for those whom he supervised."

While lack of supervision was certainly one of the factors that created an environment in which burglars could flourish, it would be difficult to convince jurors that all the blame should fall on poor leadership. Ironically, Echeles' defense strategy failed, but not because of its flaws but rather because of the extraordinary actions of one of his co-defense attorneys, Charles Bellows, attorney for Alan Clements. Bellows loved media attention; at one point, he rearranged seating to highlight his position, trying to steal the spotlight. Echeles described his actions: "Bellows exhibited pomposity and hypocrisy. He would demean [fellow attorneys] Schwarzbach and Levy", undermining defense strategies to the detriment of the defendants. Echeles said the sabotaging of his case was on full display as he was cross-examining the captain of the Summerdale station. "I was giving the Captain a very hard time. It seemed the jury was reacting favorably during my swift and accusatorial cross, [and suddenly] Bellows, of all people, jumped to his feet and loudly and vigorously objected to my cross of the captain. 'I object!' exclaimed Bellows. 'I know the Captain and he is an honorable man!'" Echeles, not easily stunned, was shocked and said, "Bellows had no right to make the objection. His malicious conduct broke the momentum of the cross. If the Captain were a friend of his, he was more interested in grand-standing and protecting his friend than helping his client, Clements, or the other defendants." Echeles noted, "Our split during the rest of the trial was, of course, inevitable."

Echeles recalled cross-examining Richard Morrison, describing him as "short of stature and slight of weight [with] a narrow, slightly twisted mouth -- looked like a rat.... He was one of those crooks whom you have to slap once to get him talking and twice to get him to stop." He went on to say, "I tried and did get Morrison irritated. He would answer some questions in a self-assured, sarcastic manner which did not endear himself to the jury." And yet again, it was not the evidence – or Richard Morrison's testimony or delivery -- that ultimately convicted the defendants; the real blow came during the closing testimonies.

Closing arguments were set for Monday, August 22, 1961, and the courtroom was packed. Judge Parsons permitted the standing room to be open, and because there was no air-conditioning, the doors to the courtroom were also flung open, allowing the spectators crammed in the corridors to hear, if not see, the closing arguments. Louis Garippo outlined the evidence and case for the prosecution; then the defense attorneys presented arguments for their clients. Echeles was the last to give a closing argument, and he recalled, "I was reciting Portia's close in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*, 'the quality of mercy is not strained, it dropped from the gentle heaven...' [and when] I finished; there were some tears on the jurors and sympathetic glances." Echeles and his fellow attorneys recessed with confidence, and he said, "The feeling was, we had pulled off the case."

However, the prosecution had saved their best for last. In a remarkable speech, Special Prosecutor Benjamin Sears reclaimed the case for the prosecution. After a three-hour closing statement, Sears ended by saying, "Were not these crimes committed in the dark of night, when peaceful citizens were asleep in bed and had the right to presume that their lives, their spouses, and yes, even their property were secured by these gentlemen in blue?" Said Louis Garippo, "Sears' closing argument was the greatest closing argument I ever heard; it was so colorful that it swayed the all women jury to come in with a guilty verdict." Julius Echeles makes a similar comment on Sears' close: "One of the most amazing closing arguments I have heard up to then and since, and I have been in the business for fifty years. It was not the evidence. Sears won the case with his speech."

All the defendants were convicted by the female jury. Mulea and Beeftink, who were said to be minimally involved in the conspiracy, were each fined \$500.00 each. The two immediately paid their fines and went on their way. All the other defendants were sentenced to the penitentiary: Allan Brinn, who jurors believed saved Morrison's life by warning him of a trap laid by the other conspirators, was given a lighter sentence of one to three years; Frank Faraci, Alex and Sol Karras and Alan Clements were each sentenced to two to five years; Patrick Groark Jr. was found guilty by Parsons and received a county jail sentence of six months and a fine of \$1,000. Groark could have avoided a jail sentence if he had admitted his part in the conspiracy, but he refused to do so.

The convictions of the eight Summerdale burglars ushered in a new era in policing. Nobody was above the law, especially the police, and the public expected more from their police department – zero tolerance for corruption is the new reality, with professionalism demanded at all levels. These are expectations that should never be forgotten or even compromised; these are also the reasons why Summerdale bears revisiting.

EPILOGUE

Richard Morrison and the corrupt Summerdale police officer's exploits changed policing forever. Morrison would go on to testify for the State in another Summerdale-related trial in March 1963; during his testimony, he mentioned the mob

doctor who treated the gunshot wound to his wrist during a failed burglary. The mob did not appreciate the shout-out; later that March, when Morrison was on his way to testify, a blue Ford vehicle pulled up to him outside of the Criminal Court building and a passenger shot at him, striking his right arm. Morrison entered the Criminal Court building and called for Louis Garippo. According to Garippo, "Morrison begged me to get in the ambulance with him because he felt that the police would kill him if he were left alone with them." The attempted mob hit on Morrison worked – when he retook the stand, he claimed he remembered nothing about the doctor. The State subsequently had Morrison transported to the Illinois/Indiana state line and set him free; it was rumored that he moved to Florida, or the mob made him disappear, but his activities after having left the State of Illinois remain unknown.

The Summerdale defendants filed various appeals so it took years before any of them went to penitentiaries, and by that time, the public spotlight had dimmed and the Summerdale Scandal had faded from the news. But the effects of the scandal were everlasting, leading to immediate and long-range permanent changes in policing. Commissioner of Police Timothy O'Connor was dismissed in 1960 and a new post, Superintendent of Police, was created, with O.W. Wilson hired for the role. During his years of service, he implemented reforms that created a technologically advanced department with vastly improved hiring and promotional procedures. Because of eight crooked cops and one diminutive burglar, the department finally grew to becoming what Wilson dreamed it could be: a proud and honorable profession.

Related Journals:

